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“Loro scrivono e stampano, io diffondo. Loro credono che un libro valga in sé e per sé, 
credono nella bellezza delle idee in quanto tali.” 
“Voi no?” 
“Un’idea vale se viene diffusa nel posto e nel momento giusti, amico mio.” 
Luther Blisset, Q 
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Introduction 
 
In the last decades, evaluation has become an essential tool for policymakers. Despite 
possible distorsions in the interpretation of the results – due to potential conflicts of interest 
groups – policy evaluation is increasingly necessary in the political debate: it provides 
unbiased estimates of the effect(s) of a programme; it judges the development process of 
the policy, giving to decision makers the opportunity to comprehend how the results were 
produced; it points out benefits and costs of a programme, addressing future interventions. 
However, it is necessary to have a critical approach to any evaluation study because this 
topic is conditioned by subjective assumptions. 
Impact evaluation has two perspectives: the first is related to accountability purposes, the 
second to research purposes. Policymakers are often interested in the former, but the latter 
is gains in importance. The aim of the second perspective is to explore the causal 
relationship between the implementation of a policy and its effects, i.e. the impact of a 
policy. It is necessary to distinguish between “change in the results” and “policy impact”: 
the first is the contribution of an intervention added to the contribution of other factors, the 
second is the change that can be credibly attributed to an intervention (European 
Commission 2014). 
Simultaneously with the increasing relevance assumed by innovation, innovation policies 
evaluation has assumed a relevant role too. Starting from the “Green Paper on Innovation” 
promoted in 1995 and arriving to the “Europe2020” programme, the European 
Commission has increasingly bet on innovation policy as a tool to improve Europe’s 
economic growth, competitiveness and social cohesion. New policy instruments have been 
introduced, trying to reorganized the different methods of support to the innovation 
process. In the last years the evolutionary approach – a branch of study on innovation – 
have demonstrated that innovation is a nonlinear complex process within a complex 
system, which requires dedicated interventions. The European Commission, and the EU 
members, have modelled their policies in order to take into account these suggestions. One 
of the main results has been a renewed attention to the Regional Innovation Systems (RIS), 
local networks of enterprises, research organizations and public administrations active in 
the innovation process. RIS have a good public administration with great experience in 
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innovation support and one or more productive industrial districts which foster cooperation 
among organizations. Clusters include public institutions and support services, and have in 
common specialization, proximity, and cooperation that lead to spillovers and synergy 
within a RIS.   
European regional policy has set innovation promotion through the financing of RIS and 
local clusters in the programming periods 2000-2006 and 2007-2013. Each european 
country implemented different policies, mainly using financing from the European 
Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund. Italy is an interesting case: during the 
programming period 2007-2013, six regions – Piedmont, Liguria, Tuscany, Umbria, 
Abruzzo, and Calabria – developed the Poli di innovazione (Innovation poles), regional 
innovation intermediaries that bring together a number of universities, services centres and 
other innovative actors which provide a range of services, including brokering and 
matchmaking. The novelty of this policy lies on its multiple goals, which are to foster the 
creation of networks between enterprises – and between enterprises and other 
organizations – and to stimulate enterprises’ economic performance subsidizing R&D 
activities. Scholars have analysed cluster and RIS activities: studies on the economic 
impact of such structures have been widespread, but little attention has been paid to 
infrastructures – like the Poli di innovazione – which are the result of a mixed top-
down/bottom up process, differently from industrial districts. 
This study seeks to assess the effectiveness of the Poli di innovazione using Tuscany 
Region as case study. This region has been choosed as a case study because of its 
relevance in the italian context: the regional government has a great experience in the 
design of innovation policies, and in Tuscany are located many industrial districts. Tuscany 
Region created the Poli di innovazione in 2011, and they were active until 2014. The 
research question concerns the goal of those poles: have they improved networking and 
economic performance of their members – in particular small and medium enterprises? The 
aim of this research is twofold: to evaluate the impact of the R&D financing supplied by 
Tuscany Region, and the impact of the network structure combined with these subsidies. It 
is actually difficult to know if these poles have created long-term networks among firms 
and organizations – due to the lack of data about firms’ relationships – but it is possibile to 
use network data between poles to assess the effect of the network structure on the firms. 
This data are deduced using the sharing of research centres, laboratories, incubators, 
7 
 
employees and consultants between poles: each pole have shared these infrastructures and 
human resources with other poles, creating an inter-pole network that – theoretically – 
should have been a benefit for the firms. 
According to economic literature, network analysis has hardly been used for policy 
evaluation purposes, but its contribution can be particularly incisive. This research is a first 
attempt to evaluate an innovation policy using methodological approaches typical of 
evaluation studies combined with Social Network Analysis (SNA). Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) and Labor Productivity (LP) have been identified as measures of 
performance. A mixed method evaluation design has been built: it consists of difference-
in-differences and matching methods, in which the counterfactual is derived from a list of 
active firms in Tuscany. 
This study is organized as follows. The first section provides a brief overview on the 
evolution of innovation theory, and a specific focus on european policies – in particular the 
innovation policies of Germany, France, and Italy. The second section describes the main 
evaluation approaches present in the literature of policy evaluation, and introduce Social 
Network Analysis as an useful instruments for evaluation methods. The third section 
include the empirical model and  a detailed description of the data set, with the results of 
the policy evaluation applied to the Tuscan case study. Conclusions and policy 
recommendations are given in the last section.  
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1. Innovation theory and innovation policies in Europe 
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Introduction 
 
Innovation is one of the driver of economic growth and it is often stimulated through 
knowledge exchanges and other types of relationships among enterprises (Aghion and 
Howitt 1997, Koskinen and Vanharanta 2002, OECD 2007, Romer 1990, Solow 1956). 
The innovation process produces externalities which strenghten the local – and global – 
economy, but sometimes this spillovers do not have a positive effect. The social return 
from innovation can be greater than the private one, i.e. enterprises allocate less resources 
to R&D and the socially optimal amount is never reached. Economic literature on 
innovation has long been framed into two main positions on the relationship between 
market structure and technological performance, both derived by Schumpeter’s point of 
views. For the early Schumpeter (1934), technological advance is a consequence of a cycle 
of entry by innovative enterprises, commercial application of new products or processes, 
and displacement of incumbents. In this case, innovation is promoted by small and medium 
enterprises (SME) owned by new businessmen which enter in the market bringing new 
products or processes. For the later Schumpeter (1942), technological progress derives 
from the industrial research laboratories of large enterprises that enjoyed positions of static 
market power. These enterprises can use their profits to finance large-scale R&D activities, 
that allow them to mantain positions of market dominance. It suggests that technological 
advance will be greater if large enterprises dominate the market, differently from the first 
point of view. 
Modern literature has produced the recognition that “the level of investment in research 
and development is likely to be too low, from a social point of view, whether market 
structure is nearly atomistic, a highly concentrated oligopoly, or something in between” 
(Martin and Scott 2000). Market failures, limited appropriability and other factors – as 
discussed above – suggest that the market system is not able to achieve the socially 
desirable level of innovation: to ensure that enterprises will start an innovation process, or 
will adopt innovations acquired from other organizations, a public intervention is desirable. 
Public institutions can use different tools to give strength to their interventions. In 
Paragraph 1.1 these tools will be examinated, together with the two reference approaches: 
the neoclassical approach and the evolutionary approach to the public policy analysis. 
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In the last years the second approach has become prevalent; this situation has led to 
reconsider innovation as a complex process within a complex system. During the 80s and 
the 90s a new branch of study introduced the concepts of National System of Innovation 
(NSI) and Regional Innovation System (RIS). Both highlight the importance of the 
Systems of innovation in stimulate the conditions to innovate, even if they differ in the 
scale level – national and global against regional and subregional level.  Basically, in a 
System of innovation there are interactions between public institutions, universities, 
schools, public and private research centres and other actors which can foster the 
innovation process: a NSI is more focused on the iterative process of learning that involve 
users, intermediaries and scientists at the national level, while a RIS is more focused on the 
tacit knowledge exchange and the development of innovative networks at the regional 
level. This concepts are examinated in Paragraph 1.2. 
The importance of the Systems of innovation has been underlined by international 
institutions, like the European Union (EU). European institutions repeatedly state that 
innovation policy is the key to recovering EU competitiveness. The Lisbon strategy in 
2000 set very ambitious goals, but the fragmentation of EU landscape is a barrier to reach 
them. There are four executive agencies which support the implementation of the 
centralised R&D programmes, 24 monitoring committees, 386 operational programmes 
under the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and European Social Fund (ESF) 
that contain an innovation component (Anvret et al. 2010). Regions in many European 
countries have legal competences and financial resources to implement regional innovation 
policies. This is especially true in federal or decentralized systems, where the territorial 
division of power allows their financial and political autonomy (Prange 2008). Usually 
regions fund innovation measures using European Union structural funds, which are based 
on the idea of supporting dynamic regional innovation systems (Landabaso et al. 2003). 
The innovation policies implemented in EU in the last decades are described in Paragraph 
1.3, with a specific focus on France, UK, Germany and Italy. 
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1.1 Public policy analysis: neoclassical VS evolutionary approach 
 
From a neo-classical point of view, innovation policies regard public support to scientific 
research; the innovation process is seen as a knowledge production function and can be 
decomposed into sequential – linear – steps. But the innovative activity is uncertain and 
related to a bounded rationality, i.e. public institutions must implement innovation policies 
to correct market failures, because knowledge is a non-excludable and non-rival good, and 
requires high investments. All these elements drive to opportunistic behaviors – “free 
riding” – and low levels of investments in R&D by enterprises. The neo-classical approach 
analyzed the efficiency of patents, copyrights, tax cuts, direct subsidies to private R&D, 
support to the public R&D and to the public demand – purchase of high-tech goods or 
creation of technological standards. 
Patents allow the entrance of new enterprises in the local or global market. Their strenght 
lies in the opportunity to do radical innovations, which are characterized by high 
uncertainty, high costs and long-term commercialization’ activities (Malerba 2000): 
without patents, radical innovations could not be introduced. The system of patents, 
however, does not guarantee an effective protection of the innovation – different countries 
have different legal systems – and sometimes it can give a sort of monopolistic power to 
the inventor. Direct subsidies were the main public instrument to support private R&D in 
OECD countries during the 1980s. Scholars studied if they replace private expenditures for 
R&D or they are additional to it: with perfect information, they are additional and 
contribute to increase enterprise’ expenditures in R&D; if information is asimmetric, the 
enterprise will use public funds to finance R&D projects that would still do. Direct 
subsidies do not have negative effects on the technological diffusion; furthermore, they are 
neutral respect to the technologies (Malerba 2000) but they can replace private R&D 
expenditures, and create problems of moral hazard. Tax cuts are similar, in their mode of 
operation, to the direct subsidies, but they have been no longer used by national 
governments because of their limited efficacy. They have different advantages – low 
administrative costs, more simplicity compared to the direct subsidies, no discrimination 
among enterprises – but also disadvantages – a possible replacement effect of private R&D 
expenditures, low impact on young and small enterprises, distorsions related to fiscal 
operations, inadequacy for complex projects of R&D 
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In contrast to the neo-classical approach, the evolutionary approach to innovation does not 
suggest which public policies implement or the optimal level of subsidies for the 
enterprises. This approach is focused on the role of the knowledge and the bounded 
rationality of the agents, and the learning process of the organizations involved in the 
innovation course. It studies interactions among different actors and linkages with 
technologies and institutions: the dynamic and irregular innovation process consider the 
possibility of a trade-off – or the failure of a trade-off – within this system, and this is what 
the evolutionary approach try to explain. From this point of view, the public policies for 
the innovation must: 
- remove possibile “lock-in” effect to facilitate the adaptation of new technologies 
and avoid failures in the learning process; 
- support the development and the matching of different skills; 
- regulate the trade-off in the innovation process and the diffusion process (Malerba 
2000). 
In the first case – failures in the learning process – a set of public policies can include the 
support to basic research, the support to high-complexity projects, a specific orientation to 
the technological diffusion and the training of human capital. Moreover, these policies 
must avoid what is called “lock-in effect”: if two or more technologies, or innovations, are 
competing for market share and one of them has an headstart, it may go on to dominate the 
market (Arthur 1989). This process can stop the research process and lock enterprises into 
an inferior design because they just want to exploit their position, i.e. they will be unable to 
compete against new improved technologies in the future. In the second case – different 
and collateral skills – the development of new technologies can involve different actors, 
enterprises and industrial sectors in the creation of a positive “buzz” of innovation and 
technological change. But if there is lack of informations and facilities nothing will 
happen. Public policies must encourage the development of networks between actors, 
enterprises and sectors, and operate on the potential demand of new technologies. Last but 
not least, the trade-off in the innovation process and the diffusion process concerns the 
choice among the exploration of new knowledge and the exploitation of the existing: 
public policies can support organizations which generate new knowledge, like universities, 
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or support market competition to avoid the creation of dominant position, like in the 
computer market through the creation of Antitrust agencies. The trade-off in the innovation 
process and the diffusion process also concerns the balancing between protection and 
diffusion of the innovation: usually, this is done by the system of patents, but sometimes 
this system can be too constricting in the long-term (Winter 1993). 
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1.2 National Systems of Innovation and Regional Innovation 
Systems 
 
Until the 1990s, the dominant model for innovation policies was focused on the supply of 
innovation inputs and support instruments to the enterprises (Tödtling and Trippl 2005). In 
the last two decades many European countries have adopted new strategies to stimulate the 
innovation process, especially at regional level. Different approaches have been attempted, 
and most of them have been addressed on SME and local systems of firms. 
This new approaches have been implemented beacause the idea of innovation changed 
itself. Innovation as a linear process, defined as a sequence of temporally and conceptually 
distinct stages, has been challanged by theories that consider innovation as a complex 
process (Russo and Rossi 2009). During the 1980s, Nathan Rosenberg reviewed some 
classical innovation issues with a great impact on policy thinking among countries 
(Rosenberg 1982). He rejected the neo-classical concepts of technology and the 
Schumpeter’s invention-innovation-diffusion schema, and influenced research programme 
and innovation literature for the next years. New non-linear models which emphasize the 
unpredictable nature of the innovation process and highlight the impact of innovation 
clusters were developed (Mytelka and Smith 2002). Two of the most important models use 
the concept of Innovation System to explain the interactions between actors that generate 
and use technology (Archibugi et al. 1998): the National System of Innovation (NSI) and 
the Regional Innovation System (RIS).  
Freeman (1988, 1987), Lundvall (1992, 1988) and Nelson (1993) gave the first definitions 
of National System of Innovation to describe a network of public and private actors whose 
actions affect the creation and the diffusion of technologies. The main idea behind this 
concept is that understanding the linkages among the actors of an innovation system is the 
key to improve their performance. The innovative performance of a country depends on 
how these actors relate to each other and how they use technologies. Freeman (1987) 
defines the NSI as a “network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose 
activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies”. For 
Nelson (1993), a NSI is “a set of institutions whose interactions determine the innovative 
performance...of national firms”. Lundvall (1992) affirms that the term “National” is not 
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referred to the government level, and that a NSI is composed by “the elements and 
relationships which interact in the production, diffusion and use of new, and economically 
useful, knowledge...and are either located within or rooted inside the borders of a nation 
state”. Archibugi (Archibugi et al. 1998) argues that this approach include “systems of 
innovation that are sectoral in dimension and those that are at a different geographical 
scale”. The NSI approach highlight the importance of taking into account the whole 
innovation system and the growing number of institutions involved in knowledge 
generation. A System of innovation is composed by many actors: enterprises, organizations 
of the financial system, public and private research institutions, organizations of the 
educational system,  national and local governments, and intergovernmental organization. 
A characteristic of the enterprises is their natural attitude to create client-supplier linkages, 
which can be realised at different levels – regional, national or global – and between 
different sectors. Local networks of enterprises are fundamental within innovation systems, 
because they aggregate organizations with various competences, stimulating interactions 
and the diffusion of suitable organizational models and technologies (Malerba 2000).  
In 1992, Philip Cooke developed a different concept of System of innovation, called 
Regional Innovation System (RIS). The main difference compared to a NSI lies in the 
scale level. To give an example, a NSI differ from a RIS because it sets scientific priorities, 
and it funds basic research and university-level training, while a RIS influences certain 
allocations but without major tax-raising (Cooke 2001). The idea of a RIS is based on five 
axes: region (a meso-level political unit that has the power to support economic 
development and innovation), innovation (of products, processes and organization), 
network (set of reciprocal or customary trust and cooperation-based linkages among actors 
to pursue common interests), learning (new levels and kind of knowledge, skills and 
capabilities that can be embedded in the routines and conventions of firms) and interaction 
(formal and informal meetings or communication focused on innovation such that firm and 
other actors could associate to learn or pursue specific project ideas). A RIS needs specific 
organizational and institutional conditions to operate: regional financial competence – both 
public and private – and support of the regional administration in co-financing R&D 
projects or in providing loan guarantees; competences of the regional administration to 
control and influence investments in hard (transports and ICT) and soft (knowledge 
centres) infrastructures; cooperation and interaction between actors; trustful labor relations 
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and worker welfare orientation at the firm level; and finally inclusivity, monitoring, 
consultation and networking propensities among policymakers (Cooke 2001). 
Cooke et al. (1997) notice that formal NSI often allocates R&D funding to large 
corporations, even if they are not innovative. They also noticed that sometimes innovation 
occurs in subnational and local clusters through the interaction of medium-sized 
enterprises. The concepts of RIS and cluster – and industrial district – are strictly related. A 
RIS has a good public administration with great experience in innovation support and one 
or more productive industrial districts – which foster cooperation among organizations and 
stimulate the (non-linear) innovation process. Clusters include public institutions and 
support services and have in common specialization, proximity, and cooperation that lead 
to spillovers and synergy within a RIS. European institutions realized that subsidize RIS 
and local clusters would encourage innovativeness and regional competitiveness: create 
proper economic and institutional conditions in a given region trigger the learning 
processes and allows regional firms to become more innovative, and adaptable to rapidly 
evolving markets. For this reason, European regional policy has set innovation promotion 
through the financing of RIS and clusters in the programming periods 2000-2006 and 
2007-2013 (Landabaso et al. 2003). 
European countries followed the “Triple Helix Model” (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000) 
to implement innovation policies whose aim is to finance RIS and clusters. This model 
take into account the pervasive development of information and communication 
technologies and the intensification of economic globalization. The strategic integration of 
research, government and industry allows to share competencies and resources, and to 
active knowledge flows: the local development is stimulated by the capacity – of the local 
sub-systems – to be synchronized and behave as a single unit, and their willingness to work 
together (Bertamino et al. 2014). 
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1.3 Innovation policies in Europe 
 
Recently the EU industrial policy has become more focused on innovation cluster and this 
concept has been included in the 2007-2013 policy guidelines. European regions have 
implemented different policies which vary in type and definition.  Table 1 shows the trend 
of the gross domestic expenditure on R&D (in percentage of the Gross Domestic Product) 
of the Eurozone countries, during the period 2000-2013. 
Table 1 Gross domestic expenditure on R&D – % of GDP – of the Eurozone countries 
(2000-2013) 
 
Source of Data: Eurostat 
Northern european countries dedicate high levels of their gross domestic expenditures – in 
percentage of GDP – to R&D activities, while southern and eastern countries have low 
rates of investment in R&D activities. Estonia is an interesting case because it had one of 
the most prominent increases until 2011, but then it started to rapidly decrease. 
Table 1 indicates that during 2000-2013 – a time frame which includes the programming 
periods 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 – there were differences among countries regarding the 
investments in R&D, which affect innovation and local development. Does it means that 
EU innovation policy in the last years has been ineffective? Actually, each country has its 
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own features, and implements EU guidelines following an approach which can be different 
from others. As showed in Table 2, the innovation performance of Germany in 2013 was 
0.709, while Latvia had a score equal to 0.221. It probably means that these two countries 
have adopted different strategies obtaining different results. The innovation performance 
index is obtained by an aggregation of 25 indicators used for measuring innovation 
performance (European Commission 2013). These indicators measure three dimensions 
and eight sub-dimensions: enablers (human resources; open, excellent and attractive 
research systems; finance and support), firms’ activities (firm investments; linkages and 
entrepreneurship; intellectual assets) and outputs (innovators; economic effects). In Table 
2, countries coloured in green are classified as “innovation leaders”, countries coloured in 
blue are classified as “innovation followers”, countries coloured in yellow are classified as 
“moderate innovators” and countries coloured in orange are classified as “modest 
innovators”. 
Table 2 Innovation performance index of the Eurozone countries (2013) 
  
Source of Data: Eurostat 
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EU countries use european funds to finance R&D projects, but they must finance 
programmes which follow the main lines agreed by the European Commission. As 
reported above, there is a great fragmentation in EU fundings for research and innovation 
projects. A large part of the EU budget is managed in partnership with national and 
regional authorities through a system of “shared management”. Actually, there are five 
main funds which operate to support economic development across all EU countries: 
- European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), 
- European Social Fund (ESF), 
- Cohesion Fund (CF), 
- European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), 
- European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF). 
The ERDF fund is probably the most relevant for R&D activities, because one of its key 
priority areas is “Innovation and research”. Their aims are: to strengthen economic and 
social cohesion in the EU (cooperation); to stimulate competitiveness and promote 
economic change through innovation (competitiveness); to support the promotion of less-
developed regions (convergence). Regional innovation strategies are parts of the ERDF 
innovative actions, and tools to strengthen RIS in less favoured regions (Landabaso et al. 
2003). 
European regions receive financing under the ERDF actions for supporting innovation 
strategies. However, regions have to interact with the central government, but each 
government has a socio-political background which shapes its own innovation strategies 
and influence regional strategies. A brief comparation between Germany, France and Italy 
– three of the biggest economies in the Eurozone and, respectively, an innovation leader, 
an innovation follower and a moderate innovator – can better illustrate the differences 
within EU countries on this topic. 
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1.3.1 Germany 
 
Germany has a multi-level governance system where responsabilities are shared between 
ministries and authorities on different levels of the political system. The public support for 
R&D activities is managed by a joint task of the federal government and the 16 Länder, 
and funding are divided into institutional funding and project funding. In addition to the 
federal ministries and the authorities of the Länder, there are also intermediaries with 
financing and consulting functions: the Joint Conference on Science; the German Science 
Council; the Office of Technology Assessment; the German Bundestag; the German 
Research Foundation; research organizations like the Max Planck Society, the Fraunhofer 
Society, the Helmholtz Association, and the Leibniz-Association. 
Innovation policies in Germany are primarily developed at regional level and there are two 
types of programmes: federal government’s programmes and Länder’s programmes. The 
latters are not focused on specific technologies but reflect the innovative potential of each 
Länder (Eickelpasch 2013). On the other hand, federal programmes – cluster-based 
technology policies – are focused on key technologies and high value-added sectors. In the 
past, a weakness of the federal programmes was the complex distribution of 
responsibilities between political levels and different ministries. In 2005 the High-Tech-
Strategy was developed to coordinate the policy instruments among the ministries involved 
in the definition of the innovation programmes. It has increased the focus on the 
commercialization of research results, it has simplified the regulation, it has supported the 
launch of startups, it has allowed the allocation of specific funds for small and medium 
enterprieses and it has implemented new line of research (Stehnken 2010). 
In the 2000s the federal government funded and supported clusters that demonstrated to 
have competence and willingness to upgrade their structures (Dohse 2007). Due to the 
Germany’s poor economic performance in the mid-1990s, the Federal Research Ministry 
pushed to a policy reorientation which had to encourage the use of lead projects as an 
element of technology promotion, the promotion of new technology-based firms and the 
support of spin-offs and SME. Region were taken into account as new reference units for 
technology policies (Dohse 2007). Two prototype models of cluster-based technology 
policies were implemented: the BioRegio contest and the InnoRegio contest. BioRegio was 
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designed as a competition in which consortia formed from public and private sector 
organizations would develop a concept for biotech research and commercialization on a 
regional basis; an independent jury was established to select three regions that could 
demonstrate they had the critical mass of competence and the willingness to upgrade their 
biotech cluster (Dohse 2007). The three regions selected were Munich, Rhineland and the 
Rhine–Neckar Triangle. This was a relatively small size initiative, but had a great impact 
on the German biotech innovation system. InnoRegio was designed to reduce the 
development gap between eastern and western regions. Regional units, composed by 
private and public institutions, could apply to the call for tenders in order to being selected. 
They needed to present a strategy of network-building and intraregional cooperation to 
produce technical, economic and social innovations. 
 
1.3.2 France 
 
In France the R&D activities are mostly conducted by public research organizations and 
the highest contribution to R&D subsidies goes to big companies and small businesses 
(OECD 2014). Three separate levels of action are considered, in the french innovation 
system: 
a) policy making, 
b) implementation (funding and programming), 
c) execution. 
Two ministries share the responsibility for research and innovation policy in France at the 
policy making level: the Ministry of Higher Education and Research and the Ministry for 
Economy, Industry and Employment. The main actors for the implementation of 
innovation policies are the National Agency for Research and the OSEO innovation, but 
are also defined and implemented at the regional level.  
There is a strong interrelationship among state, academic research, and industry. However, 
in the last years new forms of state intervention have emerged in this context: one of the 
most influential has been the creation of the Pôle de compétitivité (Competitiveness 
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clusters), local systems of enterprises, research organizations and professional training 
centres, whose aims are to promote competitivness, strengthen high-tech activities and 
support growth and employment. As highlighted in the call for projects, “a pole of 
competitiveness is the combination on a given geographic space of firms, training 
institutions and public or private research centers engaged to generate synergies in the 
execution of shared innovative projects. The partnerships can be organized towards a 
market or a scientific and technological domain”. Active partnerships were supposed to 
contribute to fostering synergies among organizations of the Pôle. An interministerial 
group assessed all the submitted projects basing on four themes: a) novelty of the proposal, 
b) internationalization, c) governance, d) economic development strategy. The 71 selected 
Poles (Figure 1) have been grouped in two categories: technological and industrial. This is 
a mixed model, in which management is entrusted to private actors in collaboration with 
local authorithies, and the central government address the research activities. 
In 2008 an evaluation of these poles was commissioned to private independent agencies. It 
has emerged that 39 poles have reached their goals, while 13 needed to redefine their 
strategies. This evaluation considered, as indicators, the adoption of cooperative dynamics, 
the responsabilization of the participants, the pursue of national research strategies, the use 
of project financing, and the integration among policies developed by the poles and 
national policies for R&D and innovation. 
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Figure 1 The 71 Pôle de compétitivité in France 
 
 
Source of data: DGCIS/DATAR (2013) 
 
1.3.3 Italy 
 
The constitutional reforms made in 2001 in Italy gave to the regions the means to 
implement their own industrial policies. Their role in managing the support for innovation 
has grown in the last years, stimulated by the European Union funding policies for RIS 
(Coletti 2007). Regional policies are co-funded through the ERDF or through the Fondo 
per lo Sviluppo e la Coesione: they finance, respectively, the Programmi Operativi 
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Regionali – POR  (Regional Operative Programmes) and the Programmi Attuativi 
Regionali – PAR (Regional Actuative Programmes). National policies are managed by 
different ministries – the Ministry of Education, University and Research, and the Ministry 
of Economic Development – and financed by national funds like the Fondo Centrale di 
Garanzia, the Fondo Italiano di Investimento, the Fondo di Rotazione per 
l'imprenditorialità, etc.; they are actualized by programs like the Programma Operativo 
Nazionale – PON (National Operative Program) and the Programma Operativo 
Interregionale – POI (Interregional Operative Program). 
From 2000 to 2006 it was a period of policy learning for the italian regions, in which they 
model their interventions and policy tools. The Ministry of Education, Universities and 
Research (MIUR), during the National Program of Research 2002-2004, created the 
Technology Districts, local aggregations of high-tech activities, made up by public 
research centers, firms and local governments, geographically concentrated. It was a first 
attempt to create, through a public policy, clusters of localized advanced technology 
activities. Technology Districts have been legally constituted by an act of the MIUR and 
have been granted by public funds from European Union and from national or regional 
sources. 
From 2007 to 2013 the italian regions reshape and improve their policies relying on the 
past experiences (Caloffi et al. 2013). Several good practices have arisen in this period. 
Region Emilia-Romagna created an High Technology Network – fourteen industrial 
research laboratories and eight innovation centres operating in six thematic areas – to 
encourage the pooling of complementary expertise. Region Piedmont, Region Trentino-
Alto Adige, and Region Umbria developed the Technology Platforms: in 2001 the 
European Commission promote the creation of sectorial Platforms, managed by the leading 
firms of those sectors, which had to define a long-term Strategic Research Agenda 
involving all the relevant stakeholders. Technology Platforms develop research and 
innovation agendas and roadmaps for action at european and national level to be supported 
by both private and public funding. There are 36 European Technology Platforms, grouped 
into five sectors: Energy, ICT, Bio-based economy, Production and processes, Transport. 
Six regions – Piedmont, Liguria, Tuscany, Umbria, Abruzzo, and Calabria – developed the 
Poli di innovazione (Innovation poles): systems of enterprises, service centres, public and 
private research organizations, whose aims are to foster the creation of networks, to 
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promote the diffusion of innovation, and sharing knowledge. These structures raised public 
actors – like universities, public research organiza-tions, services centres, business 
incubators – to a prominent position. In that sense, they are no longer only gate-keeper of 
knowledge (Kauffeld-Monz and Fritsch 2013) or innovation intermediary (Howells 2006) 
but also managers of specific structures created for the promotion and the diffusion of 
knowledge and innovation, as occurs in natural networks (Caloffi and Mariani 2011). 
Innovation poles are considered as an important lever for econonomic and productive 
systems: italian regions implemented this policy considering the recommendations of the 
European Commission. The financial support of the Innovation poles is regulated by the 
Community framework for State Aid for Research and Development and Innovation 
(2006/C 323/01), and it regards: 
- infrastructures for education and research, 
- laboratories with open access, 
- broadband infrastructures. 
The assistance is temporary and financing are continuously decreasing. Organizations 
which manage the Innovation poles use these funds to pay employees’ wages and 
administrative activities (marketing, management, organization of seminars, networking). 
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2. Evaluation methods 
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Introduction 
Evaluation studies must achieve a practical result: the measurement of the impact of a 
policy reform on a set of outcomes variables. To measure this impact, it is fundamental to 
know the difference between the participants’ outcome with and without the treatment. 
Unfortunately, it is not possibile to observe both outcomes for the same participants, and 
using the mean effect on the not treated as comparison value is uncorrect, because the two 
groups differ even in the absence of treatment. This problem is known as “selection bias” 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig 2005), and it arises when non-experimental data are using. Non-
experimental data are the most common type of data in social sciences, but they are more 
difficult to deal with, respect to experimental data.  
This bias can be reduced constructing a counterfactual group, in which the characteristics 
of the members are similar to the characteristics of the – hypotetical – group of treated 
participants which have not received the treatment. Evaluation methods in empirical 
economics are grouped into five categories: pure randomised social experiment, natural 
experiment, matching method, selection model, and structural simulation model (Blundell 
and Costa Dias 2000). The first method take into account the presence of a comparison 
group which is a randomised subset of the eligible population. This method can not be 
easily implemented, because it requires an ex ante definition of the comparison group, and 
that this group will be completely unaffected by the policy. The second method tries to find 
a naturally occurring comparison group that can mimic the properties of the control group. 
It allows to measure the average effect of the treatment on the treated removing individual 
effects and macro effects, but it requires common time effects across groups and no 
composition change within each group. The matching method try to find common values 
of observable factors among individuals – or organizations: each of them which has been 
affected by the policy is matched with an individual – or an organizations – that have the 
same values of observable factors. The main problem lies in the selection of the factors 
which address the matching. The fourth method relies on the definition of a variable that 
determines the participation but not the outcome of the programme itself. It diverges from 
the matching because it accounts for selection on the unobservables factors. The final 
method is closely related to the selection model: it separates preferences from constraints, 
but requires a believable behavioural model for individuals. 
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Methodology for non-experimental data depends on three factors: the type of available 
informations, the underlying model and the parameter of interest (Blundell and Costa Dias 
2000). Based on these factors, the choice of the estimator of the impact of the treatment is 
between the Instrumental Variables (IV) estimator, the Heckman selection estimator, the 
difference-in-differences estimator, and the matching estimator. The IV estimator is 
discussed in Paragraph 2.2.1, the Heckman selection estimator is discussed in Paragraph 
2.2.2, the difference-in-differences estimator is discussed in Paragraph 2.2.3, and the 
matching estimator is discussed in Paragraph 2.2.4. Paragraph 2.2.5 illustrates a combined 
estimator of matching and difference-in-differences. 
Despite their applications, evaluation methods do not take into account a relevant issue: the 
presence of spillovers. Not treated actors could be not interested in participate to a policy, 
because they can obtain in any case some indirect benefits from a connection with another 
actor. Relationships among actors are often not considered in evaluation desing. Social 
Network Analysis can map these relationships, and provide new insights on the evaluation 
of the policy impact. This method will be described in Paragraph 2.3.  
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2.1 To evaluate the effect of a policy 
 
It is not possible to observe the outcomes of a policy on an individual – or an organization 
– in both treatment and non treatment condition at the same time. A credible estimate of a 
counterfactual group is needed, in order to calculate the impact of the policy as the 
difference in mean outcomes between the treated and the counterfactual group. This 
approach is only valid under a precise condition: the counterfactual group must be 
statistically equivalent to the treated group, the only difference must lie in the fact that 
actors in the first group do not receive the treatment, while actors in the second group 
receive the treatment (Heinrich et al. 2010).  
Suppose that there is a policy for which it is necessary to measure the impact on some 
outcome variable Y. The difference between the potential outcome in case of treatment and 
the potential outcome in its absence is defined as the impact of a treatment for an 
individual i:  
             	 	= 	 	− 		  ( 1 )   
where d1 indicates the presence of a treatment and d0 the absence of a treatment. Two 
problems arise: in non-experimental data the assignment process is most probably not 
random, and only one of the potential outcomes is observed for each actor. This lack of 
data makes it difficult to estimate αi, so it is necessary to concentrate on average treatment 
effect on the entire population. 
Generally, an evaluation seeks to estimate the mean impact of the programme, obtained by 
averaging the impact across all the actors in the population: this parameter is called 
Average Treatment Effect (ATE): 
             	
	 = 	( 	− 		) ( 2 )   
which can be rewritten as: 
             	
	 = 	( 	|	) 	− 	(	 	|	)	 ( 3 )   
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But some actors are affected by a policy treatment, while others are not. The Average 
Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT) is more explicative of the ATE, because it 
considers only the actors which have been affected by the policy: 
             	
	 = 	( 	− 		 	|	) ( 4 )   
and equation ( 4 ) can be reformulate considering the fact that the average of a difference is 
the difference of the averages: 
             	
	 = 	( 	|	) 	− 	(	 	|	) ( 5 )   
One parameter is not observable – the expected value 	(	 	|	), the average outcome that 
the treated actors would have obtained in absence of treatment – but to assess the impact of 
the treatment it is necessary to find a proxy in order to estimate ATT. As pointed out 
before, using the mean outcome of the non treated actors is not useful, because of the 
characteristics which can determine both the participation to the policy and the outcome of 
interest. A solution is offered comparing equations ( 3 ) and ( 5 ). It can be noted that: 
             	( 	|	) 	− 	(	 	|	) 	= 	
	 + 	(	 	|	) 	− 	(	 	|	) ( 6 )   
where the term 	( 	|	) 	− 	(	 	|	) in the right sight of equation ( 6 ) is the so-called 
“selection bias”: the difference between the counterfactual for treated actors and the 
observed outcome for the untreated actors. If it is equal to zero, the ATT can be estimated 
as the difference between the mean observed outcomes for treated and not treated. 
However, it is very rare to achieve this result, but the main goal of an evaluation is to 
estimate it. 
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2.2 Methods for non-experimental data 
 
As reported in the Introduction, the correct methodology to estimate the effect of a policy 
depends on the type of available informations, the underlying model and the parameter of 
interest (Blundell and Costa Dias 2000). Longitudinal or repeated cross-sectional datasets 
support less restrictive estimators due to the richness of information. Two estimators are 
considered when using cross-sectional data: the Instrumental Variables (IV) estimator, and 
the Heckman selection estimator. If the dataset is longitudinal or a repeated cross-section, 
difference-in-differences or matching methods are more robust to estimate the impact of 
the treatment. 
 
2.2.1. Instrumental Variables (IV) 
 
The method of Instrumental Variables (IV) deals directly with selection on the 
unobservables. An IV, called Z, has the property that changes in Z are associated with 
changes in X – an exogenous variable – but do not led to change in the outcome Y. The IV 
must follows three conditions: 
- it determines the programme participation, 
- it exists a transformation g such that g(Z) is uncorrelated with the error term, 
- it is not completely – or almost – determined by X. 
This variable provides an exogenous variation used to approximate randomised trials, that 
is correlated with the participation decision but does not affect the outcomes which derive 
from the treatment (Blundell and Costa Dias 2000). For regression with scalar regressor X 
and scalar instrument Z, the IV estimator is defined as: 
 
             	β 		= 	 (′)′ ( 7 )   
where in the scalar regressor case Z, X and Y are Nx1 vectors. This estimator provides a 
consistent estimator for the coefficient β in the linear model 
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             		 = 	βX	 + 	 ( 8 )   
if Z is correlated with X and uncorrelated with the error term ϵ. 
This estimator suffers from two main drawbacks (Blundell and Costa Dias 2000). Firstly, it 
is very difficult to find an observable variable that satisfies the above conditions. 
Furthermore, in the case of heterogeneous effects with selection on expected gains, IV will 
not identify the ATT because actors will make a more informed participation decision, and 
the resulting selection process breaks the independence between β and Z. 
 
2.2.2. Heckman selection estimator 
 
Heckman (1976, 1979) has proposed a practical solution to solve the problem of sample 
selection that lead to biased estimations with OLS in econometrics. This method is well-
known as the two-steps – or the limited information maximum likelihood – method, and it 
became very popular in evaluation studies. 
To estimate the treatment effect of a policy, at least one variable with non-zero coefficient 
– independent of the error term – is required in the decision rule equation. Moreover, the 
ability to estimate consistently the joint density of the distribution of the errors is required. 
This estimator control directly for the part of the error term in the outcome equation that is 
correlated with the participation dummy variable. The procedure of estimation is divided 
into two steps: in the first, the part of the error term which is correlated with the 
participation dummy variable is estimated; then, it is included in the outcome equation and 
the effect of the policy is estimated. 
Given the following model: 
             	∗ 	= 	   	+ 	  ( 9 )   
             	!∗ 	= 	!  ! 	+ 	!  ( 10 )   
where  	= 	∗  if !∗ 	> 	0	and  	= 	0 if !∗ 	≤ 	0	. The outcome variables Y*1i and Y*2i 
are unobserved, whereas Y1i  is observed. The error terms ϵ1i and ϵ2i are are expected to be 
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positively correlated, both with a bivariate normal distribution. For the subsample with a 
positive Y*1 the conditional expectation of Y*1 is given by: 
             	(∗ |, !∗ 	> 	0) = 	   	+ 	(|! 	> 	−	!  !) ( 11 )   
Assuming a bivariate normal distribution of the error terms ϵ1i and ϵ2i, the conditional 
expectation of the error term ϵ1i is: 
             	(|! 	> 	−	!  !) = 	 &'&' 	
(	(()'*
+ ,'
-' ))
		.(()'*
+ ,'
-' ))
 ( 12 )   
where / (.) is the density function of the standard normal distribution and 0 (.) is the 
cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution. Equation ( 11 ) can be 
rewrite as: 
             	(∗ |, !∗ 	> 	0) = 	   	+ 	&'&' 	
(	(()'*
+ ,'
-' ))
		.(()'*
+ ,'
-' ))
 ( 13 )   
Heckman’s proposal is to estimate the ratio at the right side of equation ( 13 ) with a probit 
model, obtaining λ, and then estimate: 
             	() 	= 	   	+ 	&'&' 1(
2'3+ 4'
&'
5)	6 ( 14 )   
 in the second step. Heckman (1979) characterises the sample selection problem as a 
special case of the omitted variable problem, with λ being the omitted variable if OLS is 
used on the subsample for which ∗ 	> 	0 . 
 
2.2.3. Difference-in-differences 
 
An exogenous intervention may create a sort of natural randomization across actors. It 
happens when a natural disaster occurs, creating a separation between damaged and not 
damaged zones, or a policy change makes a certain group eligible to some treatment but 
keeps a similar group ineligible. If longitudinal or repeated cross-section informations are 
available, it is possibile to estimate the treatment effect without imposing the restrictive 
conditions exposed for IV and Heckman selection estimator. 
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The  difference-in-differences (DID) approach uses a before-after comparison across 
groups to estimate the treatment effect. In the case of a policy reform, DID explores a 
change in the policy occurring at some time period k, which introduces the possibility of 
receiving treatment for some actors. Each actor is observed at time t0<k and t1>k, 
respectively the pre-treatment period and the post-treatment period. The DID estimator 
measures the excess outcome growth for the treated actors compared with the not treated 
actors. Formally: 
             		 = 	 (789999 	− 	7	89999) 	−	 (7:9999 	− 	7	:9999) ( 15 )   
where 89999 and  :9999  are the mean outcomes for the treatment (T) and the comparison (C) 
group; the estimator α identifying the ATT. 
The DID estimator uses a common trend assumption and assumes no selection on the 
transitory shock, so the randomization hypothesis ruling out selection on not treated 
outcomes. Some restrictions are imposed on the error composition of the outcome equation 
for each actor. Considering the following decomposition of the unobservables: 
7 	= 	 ; 	+ 	<7 	+	=7 ( 16 )   
where ; is an individual-specific effect, <7 is a common macroeconomic effect, and =7 is 
a temporary individual-specific effect: if the expectation of 7 conditional on the treatment 
status depends on =7 , DID is inconsistent. Therefore, this approach has two main 
weakness (Blundell and Costa Dias 2009): 
- it does not control for unobserved temporary individual-specific shocks that 
influence the participation decision, 
- treated and controls must experience common trends – the same macroeconomic 
shocks. 
If the actors of the two groups have different trends, DID do not consistently estimate the 
ATT. Considering the registred outcomes for both groups – treated and controls – during a 
defined time window, the common trends assumption holds when the observed values for 
treated and controls are parallel. 
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The possibility of differential trends motivates the use of the “differential trend adjusted 
DID” estimator. If the treatment selection is independent of the temporary individual-
specific under differential trends but the common trends assumption does not hold, it is 
possibile to compare the behaviors of treated and controls before the introduction of the 
policy. It is necessary to find a time period (t*, t**) in which similar macro trends have 
occurred, and comparing the DID estimate of the treatment impact – with the bias –from 
differential trend with the estimate of the differential trend over (t*, t**). This estimator 
has been proposed by by Bell, Blundell, and Van Reenen (1999), and consistently estimate 
ATT; equation ( 15 ) can be reformulated as: 
	 = 	 (789999 	− 	7	89999) 	− 	(7:9999 	− 	7	:9999) 	− 	(7∗∗89999 	−	7∗89999) 	−	 (7∗∗:9999 	− 	7∗:9999) ( 17 )   
2.2.4. Matching 
 
Matching is a non parametric approach to reproduce the treatment group among not treated 
actors. The strenght of this method is the chance to re-establish the condition of an 
experiment: it constructs a sample counterpart for the missing information on the treated 
outcomes had they not been treated by matching each treated actor with not treated actors. 
The matching assumptions ensure that the remaining difference between the two groups is 
due to the programme participation (Blundell and Costa Dias 2009). 
Matching can be used with longitudinal or cross-sectional data, and can be combined with 
other methods to obtain more accurate estimates of the treatment effect. A general starting 
point considers the outcome equations of treated and not treated: 
8 	= 	>8() 	+	8  ( 18 )   
: 	= 	>:() 	+	:   ( 19 )   
where YT is the outcomes of the treated, YC is the outcomes of the not treated (control 
group), X is a set of observable variables and ϵT and ϵC are the error terms for treated and 
controls. To identify the ATT, matching assumes the conditional independence between 
not treated outcomes and programme participation: 
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: 	 ⊥ 	 	|	 ( 20 )   
This assumption is called Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA), and it means that 
the outcome of the not treated actors is independent of the participation d1, once one 
control for the observable set of variables X. This is the so-called counterfactual: given X, 
YC is what the treated outcome would have been they not been treated. For each treated 
actor, one can look for a not treated actor – or a set of not treated actors. Matching is 
explicitly a process of rebuilding an experimental data set (Blundell and Costa Dias 2009): 
a correct data collection is needed, in order to avoid the presence of observations which 
could invalidate the matching process. 
Moreover, matching assumes that the probability of being treated is between zero and one, 
in order to guarantee that everyone can receive the treatment and each treated actor will be 
matched with a counterpart: 
0	 < 	A(	|	) 	< 	1 ( 21 )   
In equation ( 21 ) d1 indicates the reception of the treatment, and X is a set of explanatory 
variable(s). The matching estimator is calculated as it follows. Let S represents the 
subspace of the distribution of X that is both represented among the treated and the 
controls: this subspace is the “common support” of X, and is the whole domain of X 
represented among the treated. The ATT over S is: 
	 = 		 C (
8
2∈E 	− 	: 	|	, )	F(	|	)
	C F(	|	)2∈E
 ( 22 )   
 
The numerator of equation ( 22 ) is the expected gain from the programme among the 
treated actors for whom has been found a comparable group of not treated actors. This gain 
is integrated over the distribution of observables among treated and re-scaled by the 
measure of the common support. It can be interpreted as the mean difference in outcomes 
over the common support, weighted by the distribution of participants. 
Matching does not requires particular restrictions on the outcome equation or the 
unobservable term, but the assurance that comparisons are statistically similar to what the 
treated observations would be had they not participated to the programme. Another 
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limitation is related to the range of variables which compone X: if the number of variables 
is too high, there can be “curse of dimensionality”, a problem that arises when analyzing 
and organizing data in high-dimensional spaces. To deal with this problem, Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983) suggest to use a balancing score. If the potential outcomes are 
independent of treatment conditional on variables X, they are also independent of treatment 
conditional on a balancing score g(X). Usually, this is carried out on the propensity to 
participate; given the matching assumptions of equation ( 20 ) and equation ( 21 ), the 
conditional independence assumption is still valid controlling for P(X) instead of X: 
(8 , : 	 ⊥ 	 	|	A() ( 23 )   
where YT and YC are the outcomes for treated and controls, and P(X) is the “propensity 
score”, the probability for an actor to be treated given X. The ATT can be estimated as: 
	 = 	G(2)	|	 	{(8	|	, A()) 	− 	(: 	|	, A())} ( 24 )   
which is the mean difference in outcomes weighted by the propensity score distribution of 
participants. To implement the propensity score matching, some rules have to be followed. 
To estimate the probability of participation, logit and probit models must be used for the 
binary treatment case; in the case of multiple treatment, it is possible to use both 
multinomial logit and multinomial probit models, even if the latter is preferable because it 
has less stronger assumptions than multinomial logit (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2005). 
Another importan issue is the choice of the variables to insert in the propensity score 
model: omitting important variables can increase bias in the estimates, but variables need 
to influence simultaneously the participation decision and the outcomes variable, and must 
be unaffected by the participation. Moreover, Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) point 
out that data for treated and not treated actors should come from the same source. 
Propensity score offers the chance to assign different weights to the neighbours in the 
process of matching. There are different matching algorithms which can be implemented, 
as illustrated in Table 3. 
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Table 3 Characteristics of the algorithms of matching 
Algorithm of 
matching       Characteristics 
  
Nearest Neighbor 
− with replacement the quality of matching 
increase, while bias decrease 
− with oversampling variance decrease, while 
bias increase 
  
Caliper 
− high quality of the matches 
− risk of increasing variance 
− need to choose an appropriate tolerance level 
  
Radius 
− same characteristics of the Caliper matching, 
but it avoids the risk of bad matches 
− trade-off between the dimension of the 
neighbourhood and the quality of the matches 
  
Stratification 
− problem: it discards observations in blocks 
where either treated or controls are absent 
− need to choose an appropriate number of strata 
  
Kernel 
− lower variance (more information used) 
− problem: use of observations that lead to bad 
matches 
  
Local Linear − similar to the Kernel, but includes a linear term in the weighting function 
  
Weighting − the propensity score need to be known 
  
 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2005) highlight the peculiarity of each algorithm in terms of bias 
and efficiency. The Nearest Neighbor (NN) takes each treated actor and searches for the 
control actor with the closest propensity score. Variants of NN are represented by matching 
with replacement – using the not treated actors more than once as a match – and without 
replacement – using the not treated actors just as one match. It is also possibile to use more 
than one nearest neighbor (“oversampling”): it reduces variance because more 
informations are available to construct the counterfactual for each actor, but usually 
increase the bias because of the average poorer matches. 
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In addition to the NN, Caliper matching imposes a maximum level to the propensity score 
distance (caliper) among actors. The quality of the match increases, but if fewer matches 
are available the variance of the estimates increases too. Dehejia and Wahba (2002) 
suggest a variant of this algorithm called Radius matching: the novelty lies in the use of all 
the comparison actors within the caliper as counterfactual, and not only the nearest 
neighbor within each caliper. 
Stratification matching divides the range of variation of the propensity score into intervals, 
and calculates the impact within each interval by taking the mean difference in outcomes 
between treated and controls. 
With Kernel matching all the treated actors are matched with a weighted average of all 
controls, and the weights are inversely proportional to the distance between the propensity 
scores of treated and controls. Using so many controls increase the number of 
informations, decreasing variance. Local Linear (LL) matching is another non-parametric 
estimator that uses weighted averages of all the controls to construct the counterfactual, but 
it differs from Kernel matching because it includes a linear term in the weighting function, 
which helps to avoid bias. 
Finally, Weighting assumes that propensity scores can be used as weights to obtain a 
balanced sample of treated and controls. If the propensity scores are known, the estimator 
can be calculated as the difference between the weighted average of the outcomes for 
treated and not treated actors (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2005). 
 
2.2.5. Difference-in-differences and matching 
 
Difference-in-differences (DID) allows to compare actors which received a treatment and 
actors which do not received a treatment, taking into account the restriction on common 
trends. This comparison, however, is still affected by the problem of non-random sample 
selection: matching methods can help in addressing endogeneity and provide more 
accurate estimates. Matching controls for the selection bias restricting the DID estimates to 
a sub-sample of actors based on a set of observable characteristics. As method of matching 
to employ, propensity score matching is very attractive because the set of observable 
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characteristics can be very high (“curse of dimensionality”), and using propensity score 
gives the opportunity to obtain unbiased estimates.     
The implementation of these technique follows three steps. In the first step, a logit/probit 
model – or a multinomial logit/probit model, it depends by the considered treatment – is 
launched, in order to discover which actor’s characteristics drive the process of 
involvement in the treatment. The second step consists in matching treated actors with 
controls according to their propensity scores. In the last step, DID is applied to analyse the 
gap in the outcomes of interest between the two groups before and after the treatment 
period. 
The combination of difference-in-differences and matching is the optimal way to control 
for divergences in performances between treated and controls. It decreases the selection 
bias and addresses the endogeneity problem, providing more accurate estimates. Blundell 
and Costa Dias (2000) emphasize the benefits of this combination to control for observable 
and unobservable but constant differences between treated and controls: matching accounts 
for differences in observable characteristics, DID accounts for the unobserved determinant 
of participation to the treatment represented by individual/time-specific components of the 
error term. Combining equation ( 16 ) with equation ( 18 ) and equation ( 19 ), it is possible 
to assume the following model: 
78 	= 	>78() 	+	; 	+	<78 	+ 	=78  ( 25 )   
7: 	= 	>7:() 	+	; 	+ 	<7: 	+ 	=7:  ( 26 )   
where the error term is decomposed into an individual-specific effect ; , a common 
macroeconomic effect <7 ,	and a temporary individual-specific effect =7 , and where the 
function g(X) change over time. The conditional independence assumption expressed in 
equation ( 20 )  
7: 	− 	7	: 		 ⊥ 	 	|	 ( 27 )   
where t1 and t0 stand for the period of post-treatment and the period of pre-treatment. This 
is equivalent to: 
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(>7: () 	+	<7: ) 	− 	(>7	: () 	+	<7	: ) 	⊥ 		|	 ( 28 )   
which can be rewritten as: 
(>7: () 	−	>7	: ()) 	+	(	<7: 	− 	<7	: ) 	⊥ 		|	 ( 29 )   
where the matching now is expressed in terms of before-after evolutions instead of levels. 
Equation ( 29 ) means that controls have evolved in the same way the treated would have 
done had they not been treated (Blundell and Costa Dias 2000). The effect of the treatment 
on the treated can be estimated as: 
	 = 	J[(
∈8
7 	− 	7	) 	− 	JLM
M∈:
(M7 	− 	M7	)]O  ( 30 )   
where T is the group of the treated, C is the group of the controls, Wij is the weight placed 
on comparison actor j for actor i, and wi accounts for the reweighting that reconstructs the 
outcome distribution for the treated sample. 
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2.3 The Social Network Analysis (SNA) 
 
A policy can affect hundreds – or thousands – of actors for various purposes: to increase 
individual earnings, to support the integration of disadvantaged people, to finance R&D, 
etc. Sometimes these actors are involved in a relationships network, which can affect the 
policy programme and which depends on the individual characteristics of the actors 
themselves. The evaluation methods described in the previous paragraphs account for 
individual-specific characteristics, but not for network characteristics. These characteristics 
could interfere with actors’ behavior. The presence of positive spillovers affects the 
participation to a policy: some actors can decide to ignore a policy programme because 
they have connections to actors which are involved anyway. Social Network Analysis 
(SNA) allows to consider this factor: it maps the relationships among a group of actors and 
analyse the characteristics of the network. The attributes of the actors can be interpreted as 
a function of their location in the network: network position becomes a key variable, since 
it could be considered an intangible strategic resource (Wasserman and Faust 1994).     
Sometimes the policy itself considers, as related purpose, the support in the creation – or 
the improvement – of a network. Organizations which are embedded in systems of social 
relations enjoy a privileged position relative to isolated ones, and this is why policymakers 
are interested in the development and the strenghtening of local networks. For Granovetter 
(1985) transaction costs can be kept to a minimum if firms are embedded in networks of 
social relations that monitor and sanction opportunistic behaviors. Powell (1990) 
investigates the relationship between governance structure and state policies, and discovers 
that networks are significant in a domain between the flexibility of the market and the 
rigidity of organizational authority. For Burt (2000), networks provide order to 
disconnected parts of organizations and markets. 
Being involved within a network fosters the creation of advantages. The establishment of a 
web of collaborations allows to reduce socioeconomic risks, to obtain informations which 
are usually not available, to establish new standards of communications which can increase 
social benefits, etc. There is a wide variability in the presence of linkages across actors, 
and a wide variability of benefits deriving from the membership. In a network of firms, the 
main advantages are related to: 
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- the exchange of knowledge and capabilities from partner firms (Mowery et al. 
1996), which is justified by the consideration that firms are characterized by 
heterogeneous knowledge, 
- the rapidity through which the network puts organizations in contact, even when 
they are not formally connected to each other (Giuliani and Pietrobelli 2011), 
- the ability to maintain stable and high-quality relationships over time, fostering 
trust and reciprocity (Giuliani and Pietrobelli 2011). 
Networks are particularly relevant for the diffusion of innovation, which is stimulated by 
the interaction and the cooperation of different actors (Powell et al. 1996). In a situation of 
market failure, firms may find inter-organizational networks as safety nets against 
unfavorable business climate; networks reduce information asymmetries and strengthen the 
lobby power of the firms, and enable an upgrade of their capabilities. 
SNA is a social sciences branch that is based on the assumption that relationships among 
actors are important to explain their nature, behavior, and outputs. A “social network” can 
be defined as a set of relationships that apply to a set of actors, as well as any other 
additional informations on these actors (Prell 2012). SNA uses graph theory – a branch of 
mathematics that focuses on the quantification of networks – to describe and visualize 
social networks: a graph is a visual representation of a network, were actors are 
represented as nodes or vertices and ties are represented as lines. Studying networks has 
multiple advantages. The first advantage is the clearness in explaining the structure of 
relationships between actors. SNA provides a method to investigate this structure, to 
represent it graphically, and building on that to achieve new developments. Another 
advantage is its applicability to various fields of research. SNA is widely recognized as a 
multidisciplinary pursuit, even if its historical development has followed a nonlinear path. 
Scholars tend to agree that this discipline started with psychiatrist Jacob Moreno, that – in 
collaboration with Helen Hall Jennings – developed in 1934 a technique called 
“sociometry”, a quantitative method for studying the structure of groups and the position of 
individuals within groups (Moreno and Jennings 1934). During the same period, a british 
social anthropologist called Alfred Radcliffe-Brown started to explore new ways for 
studying structural issues. He made a number of generalizations about the nature of social 
relations, and argued that society developed certain structures naturally in efforts to fulfil 
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certain functions (Radcliffe-Brown 1952). Radcliffe-Brown was the supervisor of W. 
Lloyd Warner, who worked in the Anthropology Department and the Business School at 
Harvard and was the first to to use the social networks approach to empirically analyse the 
interpersonal relationships among a group of workers of the Western Electric company in 
Illinois – with the psychologist Elton Mayo. Ideas related to social networks were 
presented also in the studies of sociologists Simmel, Durkheim and Weber, but only in the 
1950s – with the theoretical work of Homans on social relations (Homans 1950) – and in 
the 1970s – thanks to the dedication of the Harvard Sociology Department’s leader 
Harrison White – sociology’s contribution to social network analysis became evident. 
Modern developments of SNA have been involved statistics, computer science and 
economics: in 1980s and 1990s the development of statistical models for the analisys of 
social networks data has increased, in particular for Exponential Random Graph Models 
(ERGM), which treat the social network as the dependent variable and whose aim is to 
explain it. SNA is in continue development: computer simulations of networks evolution 
often make a set of simplifying assumptions regarding network dynamics, but the 
availability of big data is changing it, and in the future the real challenge will be the 
collection of those data. 
 
2.3.1. SNA and evaluation methods 
 
SNA has hardly been used for policy evaluation purposes, but its contribution can be 
particularly incisive. Most of the available evaluation attempts are based on a very poor 
understanding of what networks are, and key concepts like “networking” and 
“connections”are often measured through rough indicators (Giuliani and Pietrobelli 2011). 
Its strenght lies in the identification of the relationship types existing between different 
actors. Figure 2 shows two different network structures of the same set of actors. In the 
first case (a) each actor is connected with just another actor; in case (b) every actor is 
connected with actor A, and the edges between actor A and actor C – and actor B and actor 
D – are bi-directional. These differences are very important, as they have implications on 
the way assets (advices, goods, resources, etc.) circulate; actors’ position changes and the 
way to measure it assumes a relevant role. 
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Figure 2 Example of network structures 
 
(a)                                                                      (b) 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
 
SNA allows to use a reliable network measurement. Depending on the nature and 
characteristics of the linkages, the position of an actor may reflect its power, its prestige, or 
its access to – or control of – resources (Giuliani and Pietrobelli 2011). Generally, if an 
actor has a central position it is favored compared to the others, but SNA can shows that it 
is not always true. Measures of centrality – referred to single actors – are the first attempt 
to start the analysis of the prominent actors within a network. The most widely used 
measures of centrality for complete networks are: 
- Degree centrality, 
- Eigenvector centrality, 
- Betweenness centrality, 
- Closeness centrality, 
- Bonacich power centrality (beta-centrality). 
To calculate these measures – and to visualize networks – a proper systematization of data 
is necessary. For this reason, network data are organized as network matrices. Matrices 
produce algebraic representations of network relations and facilitate quantitative analyses. 
A network matrix is different from the classical case-by-variable matrix: data are organized 
as case-by-case matrices (“adjacency matrices”) or case-by-events matrices (“incidence 
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matrices”), where the cells represent the presence or the absence of a tie among actors 
(Prell 2012). If in an adjacency matrix the values are 1’s and 0’s it is called “binary 
adjacency matrix”, and it only conveys the presence or the absence of a relation; but the 
intensity of the ties can be expressed through values, and in this case the matrix is called 
“valued adjacency matrix”. Matrices can be symmetric or asymmetric, it depends on the 
direction of the ties: a symmetric matrix contains data for an undirected network, an 
asymmetric matrix records the direction of ties. 
Degree centrality is the most simple form of centrality measure: it is the number of 
contacts of an actor in a network. To obtain it, it is necessary to count the number of alters 
adjacent to the actor: 
P 	= 	JQM
R
MS
	= 	JQM
R
S
 ( 31 )   
 
where Ci stands for “degree centrality of actor i”, xij is the value of the tie from actor i to 
actor j, xji is the value of the tie from actor j to actor i, and n is the number of nodes (actors) 
in the network. If directional data are available, indegree centrality and outdegree centrality 
can be calculated. Indegree centrality is the number of ties received by an actor, outdegree 
centrality is the number of ties given by that actor. The former is a measure of 
“popularity”, the latter is a measure of “expansiveness”. 
Eigenvector centrality expands the notion of degree centrality. It is the sum of an actor’s 
connections to other actors, weighted by their degree centrality. To compute this type of 
centrality, the network must have undirected data, i.e. a symmetric matrix. The eigenvector 
centrality for node i is calculated solving the equation: 

Q	 = 	1Q	 ( 32 )   
where A is the adjacency matrix of the graph G with eigenvalue λ, and x is the largest 
eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix. 
Degree centrality is very intuitive, but it is not considered the most powerful measure of 
centrality, because it looks at the immediate ties of each actor (Prell 2012). Eigenvector 
centrality takes into account the rest of the network, but it is still concentrated on the 
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number of actors reached by every single actor. Betweenness centrality captures another 
dimension: it considers where actors are placed within the network. If an actor is placed 
among two disconnected actors it means that it has an high value of centrality, because it 
acts as a bridge between two parts of the network that – in its absence – would never been 
in contact (Figure 3). 
Figure 3 Betweenness graph 
 
 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
Figure 3 perfectly illustrates this situation, in which actor C connects actor O – and the 
actors which are connected with it – and actor A – and the group of actors which gravitate 
around it. It is clear that the importance of C is higher than what it emerges only 
considering its degree centrality. Betweenness centrality is calculated as: 
P 	= 	J
>TM
>M 										OUVW	U X Y X Z ( 33 )   
 
where gikj is the number of geodesics linking actor i and j that pass through k, and gij is the 
number of geodesics linking actor i and j.  
Closeness centrality is another measure of centrality which consider the network as a 
whole, differently from degree centrality. Its peculiarity lies in the fact that it emphasizes 
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actors’ independence. If an actor is very close to many other actors, it can quickly reach 
anyone without having to pass through intermediaries: in this sense, an actor with an high 
closeness centrality is someone who could easily mobilize a network (Prell 2012). 
Closeness centrality is determined by the shortest path lenghts linking actors together: 
actors which have the shortest distance to other actors have the most closeness centrality. 
Closeness centrality is calculated as: 
P 	= 	JM
R
MS
 ( 34 )   
 
where dij is the distance connecting actor i to actor j. To calculate this measure it is 
necessary to remove all the isolate actors of the network, as closeness centrality can be 
calculated only on fully connected networks. Moreover, using a directed network is 
completely different from using an undirected network: in the first case actor i can reach 
actor j only if there is a tie from i to j, while in the second case the existence of a 
connection allow both i and j to reach each other. 
Finally, Bonacich power centrality – also called beta-centrality – is a slightly different 
measure of centrality. The above measures are referred to single actors, and their 
importance in the network depends on their own connections and positions. Philip 
Bonacich (Bonacich 1987) pointed out that the classical measures – degree, eigenvector, 
betweenness, closeness – to calculate actors’ centrality only considering their immediate 
contacts and not the wider network structure; this limitation is due to the nature of the 
relational context, and bring to different results. Beta-centrality is calculated as: 
P 	= 	([	 − 	 
)	
1 ( 35 )   
where α is a scaling vector, which is set to normalize the score, β reflects the extent to 
which the centrality of actors related to actor i is weighted, A is the adjacency matrix, I is 
the identity matrix, and 1 is a matrix of all ones. The magnitude of β reflects the radius of 
power: small values weight local structure, larger values weight global structure. If β > 0, 
actor i has higher centrality when tied to actors which are central; if β < 0, actor i has 
higher centrality when tied to actors which are not central; if β = 0, beta-centrality is equal 
to degree centrality. 
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There are many qualitative and quantitative approaches to assess the effect(s) of a policy. 
Qualitative methods can provide a rich description of a policy process, but they generally 
fail to assess its impact. Impact evaluation seeks the causal link between the policy and the 
impact, and it can be found through quantitative approaches. SNA allows to integrate 
qualitative and quantitative methods. With SNA it is possibile to visualize changes in the 
network before and after the introduction of a policy, and assessing whether the policy-
targeted network has achieved the expected results. Scholars have applied SNA to policy 
evaluation: Maffioli (2005) analysed the impact of networking policies on firm-level 
performance, using centrality measures within econometric models; Ubfal and Maffioli 
(2010) evaluated the impact of funding on research collaboration, applying centrality 
measures in a difference-in-differences model. SNA offers valuable network indicators – 
both at actor and network level – which can be used in econometric estimates of a policy 
impact. Including actor-level centrality indicators in econometric estimates can test 
whether a policy has made an impact on actors’ relationships, which are in turn held 
responsible for the effectiveness of the programme (Giuliani and Pietrobelli 2011); 
including network-level centrality indicators can test if the structure of a network affects 
actors’ performance, and how much it is affected. SNA can be very helpful in an 
evaluation process, as it detects the presence of relationships between a group of actors, i.e. 
to control for possible spillovers from treated to not treated actors and find a proper 
counterfactual. 
Looking at the actor-level perspective, indicators of position can be included as 
independent variables in an impact assessment. Using this approach, evaluators may test 
whether an improvement in the performance of an actor is due to its connections, and if its 
position, combined with certain characteristics of the actor, is most likely to generate an 
improvement in the performance: 
 	= 	Z	 + 	P 	+ 	  	+ 	 ( 36 )   
In equation ( 36 ), the performance Yi of actor i is affected by its centrality in the network 
(Ci) and set of covariates Xi which describe some characteristics of i. As centrality 
measure, one can use degree centrality, eigenvector centrality, betweenness centrality, 
closeness centrality, and beta-centrality. This is just a little contribution of SNA to 
evaluation methods, because its potential is certainly more expansive. 
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3. Case study: the Tuscan Poli di innovazione 
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Introduction 
 
This Chapter illustrates the results of an analysis on the innovation policies promoted by 
Tuscany Region. This Region is particularly indicated as a case study because it has great 
experience in the design of innovation policies, and because it is one of the most 
industrialized Italin regions. Difference-in-differences and matching evaluation, in 
combination with Social Network Analysis, are used to test the impact of these policies. 
Tuscan policies are characterized by the recourse to R&D subsidies and the promotion of 
local networks. The empirical evidence about the efficacy of R&D subsidies has been 
widely discussed, but the results are mixed. Analyzing the Small Business Innovation 
Research programme in the United States, Wallsten (2000) finds that public grants displace 
firm expenditures dollar for dollar. Lach (2002) shows that subsidies have been effective 
for small firms in Israel, while they had a negative effect on large firms. Gonzalez et al. 
(2005) in analysing Spanish data find that only a small subset of firms would not have 
undertaken R&D activity in the absence of the subsidy, while there is no evidence of 
crowding out among the innovation active firms. Gorg and Strobl (2007), using an Irish 
sample of firms, conclude that public subsidies replace private R&D expenditure when the 
award is substantial. Sissoko (2013) analyses Eureka, an European program which 
subsidizes the formation of joint venture for R&D activities, and discovers that less 
productive firms gain more from R&D subsidies. 
In the last years, because of the number of interventions and the amount of public 
resources involved, the number of studies which examine the effect of italian innovation 
policies has increased. Merito et al. (2008) evaluate the efficacy of the subsidies awarded 
in 2000 by the Special Fund for Applied Research of the Ministry of University and 
Research, introduced with the aim of supporting the research component of industrial 
R&D; they find that four years after the award of the subsidy, the policy had had little 
effect on number of employees, sales, productivity, labor costs and patent applications. 
Fantino and Cannone (2011) examine the efficacy of two European regional programs 
aiming at supporting innovative activity of small and medium firms in Piedmont and find 
limited effectiveness. Bronzini and Iachini (2011) when considering another regional 
program in Emilia Romagna find a positive effect only for small firms. de Blasio et al. 
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(2011) study an an italian programme of subsidies for the applied development of 
innovations, and they discover that it was not effective in stimulating innovative 
investment. 
The promotion of local networks if often related to R&D subsidies. Being involved in a 
network offer incentives and opportunities which can upgrade their effect, and sometimes 
they are conditioned by the involvement within the network. In 2008, Tuscany Region 
decided to active a call for tender for small and medium enterprises called Bando per 
l’acquisizione di servizi qualificati1 to finance the purchase of qualified services. In 2011, 
this call for tender has been related to the creation of the Poli di innovazione: twelve local 
network founded to support the diffusion of knwoledge and innovation among Tuscan 
enterprises. The firms which joined these networks could receive a benefit in the call for 
tender. The purpose of this research is twofold: 
- to assess the impact of the subsidies on the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and the 
Labor Productivity (LP) of the firms; 
- to assess the presence of a relationship between the above performance and the 
network created by the Poli di innovazione. 
The measurement of the performance of a firm lead to a non-negligible problem. The 
impact of a policy is commonly evaluated by comparing the performance of a firm the 
period before and after the treatment, or the performance of the treated and the non-treated 
firms. Unfortunately, the impact of a policy can only be known in comparison with would 
have happened to the firm had it not treated by the policy, i.e. the application of a proper 
evaluation method is required. In Paragraph 3.1 it is proposed a description of the Tuscan 
framework for innovation policies. Paragraph 3.2 illustrates the creation process of the 
dataset used for the evaluation, while in Paragraph 3.3 the empirical strategy and the 
results of the analysis are exhibited.  
                                                             
1
 This call for tender has been funded by the POR CREO 13.b (Programma Operativo Regionale – Obiettivo 
Competitività Regionale e Occupazione, Regional Operative Programme – Object Regional Competitivity and 
Occupation); its extended name is “Bando per la presentazione delle domande di contributo Aiuti alle Pmi 
per l'acquisizione di servizi qualificati”. 
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3.1 Innovation policies in Tuscany Region: a brief overview 
 
The Tuscan production system is marked by the significative presence of small and 
medium enterprises. Within this system, tacit knowledge assumes a relevant added value, 
even if Tuscany is also a repository of a wealth of codified knowledge spread by 
universities and scientific centres. Tuscany Region is particularly focused in supporting the 
processes of technology transfer and innovation within productive systems, aimed at 
improving the competitiveness of enterprises (Bellandi et al. 2014).  
The first regional innovation policies have been developed in the late 1990s. The European 
Union sponsored the diffusion of Regional Innovation Strategies, in the form of RITTS 
(Regional Innovation and Technology Transfer Strategies), RTP (Regional Technology 
Plans), and other activities. The Region built three ad hoc public structures which had the 
aims to facilitate technological transfer and create linkages between universities and firms. 
During the programming period 2000-2006 the Region changed its strategy and strated to 
support specific projects of technological transfer. The main problem observed in this 
strategy was an increase of the flows of resources destined to similar projects. Another 
problem was the intensification of subjects in the research support system. 
Due to these problems, in the programming period 2007-2013 the Region approved four 
(plus one) strategies for the reorganization of the regional system of innovation: 
- in 2008 it created a catalogue of advanced and qualified services (Catalogo dei 
servizi avanzati e qualificati per le PMI toscane dell'industria, artigianato e servizi 
alla produzione), in which SME could find a list of the qualified services offered by 
Tuscan research organizations and services centres. Tuscany Region created a 
permanent call for tender in which every three months the firms could apply to 
obtain a loan dedicated to the purchase of services for an innovative project: the so-
called Bando per l’acquisizione di servizi qualificati. 
- In 2009 it created a business incubators network called Tecnorete – Rete regionale 
del sistema di incubazione di impresa, which include all the regional subjects 
involved in the technological transfer. 
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- In 2011 it approved the Strategic Documents of the fourteen Centri di competenza, 
infrastructures dedicated to the technological transfer, the diffusione of innovation, 
the support of business start-up, and the supply of advanced and qualified services; 
- In 2011 it approved the creation of the twelve Poli di innovazione (Innovation 
poles), local networks of firms, universities, public and private research centres, 
services centres, training centers, incubators, and laboratories. The identification of 
such local networks has been the result of a mix top-down/bottom-up approach, in 
which the membership has been setted without restrictions. 
These strategies have been linked together because the Centri di competenza, whose 
assignment is to supply advanced and qualified services, belong to the Tecnorete, i.e. they 
are allowed to establish a pole with other public research organizations, business 
incubators or other subjects involved in the technological transfer. 
In addition to the above strategies, another policy is going to be implemented – in the next 
years – by the Tuscany Region: the constitution of the Distretti Tecnologici (Technological 
Districts). The Technological Districts are structures for industrial research, and their aim 
is to plan integrated activities of R&D among firms and research organizations. They have 
been developed consistent with the National Research Plan 2010-2012, who defined these 
structures as local aggregations of research organizations, small and big firms, and local 
institutions created for the reinforcement of the productive areas through research on key 
technologies. Moreover, that Plan provided specific funds for them. The original idea of 
the Region was to transform the Poli di innovazione into the technical secretariat of the 
Distretti Tecnologici, but this reorganization is developing in this years and the new assett 
is actually unknown. 
 
3.1.1. Features of the Poli di innovazione 
 
The Poli di innovazione are particularly relevant in this context because they are an 
element of novelty compared to the classical italian industrial district. Tuscany Region, in 
order to promote innovation and technology transfer according to the communication n° 
323/2006 of the European Union Commission, constituted twelve poles since July of 2011. 
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These poles are structures of synergistic coordination among different actors of the 
innovation process and their creation has been inspired by the European Union regulation 
on state aid for research, development and innovation. A mixed top-down/bottom-up 
approach has been followed in the guidelines, because Tuscany Region forced their 
creation but gave to the local actors the opportunity to develop an autonomous strategy. 
The twelve poles are: 
- Polo Optoscana – Optoelettronica e Spazio (optoelectronics); 
- Innopaper (paper business sector); 
- Otir 2020 (fashion); 
- Polo di innovazione Scienze della Vita (life sciences); 
- Polo Pietre Toscane (stone sector); 
- Polo per l'eccellenza nautica toscana – PENTA (nautical sector); 
- Polis (technologies for sustainable cities); 
- Nanoxm (nanotechnology); 
- CENTO – Polo di competenza per il sistema interni (furniture); 
- PIERRE – Polo Innovazione Energie Rinnovabili e Risparmio Energetico 
(renewable energies); 
- Polo12 (mechanics); 
- Politer (ICT and robotics). 
Each pole has its own characteristics – in terms of internal organization, management, 
strategic plan – but they also have common features imposed by the Region. They can have 
one or more managers – public or public-private organizations which belong to the 
Tecnorete – and one of them must be the “leader”: a supervisor that control business 
activities – networking, technological and knowledge diffusion – and communicates with 
the Region. The partnership among two or more managers need to be legally 
institutionalize using the legal form of an ATS (Associazione Temporanea di Impresa, an 
enterprises temporary association). 
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There are three categories of poles according to the starting number of member firms and 
other financial parameters, and managers have the pledge to increase the number of the 
member firms (Table 4). Another target is to increase the supply of qualified services and 
to develop new systems of knowledge transfer. The ATS can be organized in scientific 
committees and strategic committees, which can be arranged according to the decisions of 
the managers. 
Table 4 Categories of the Poli di innovazione: classification parameters, targets and 
maximum subsidy 
 
Initial 
members 
Target1: 
scouting 
of new 
firms 
Target2: 
increase 
of new 
firms (%) 
Target3: 
Contract
ualized 
services 
Target4: 
Supplied 
services 
Target5: 
turnover 
Max 
subsidy 
        
Category
1 >160 160 50 80 40 
500,000 
€ 
800,000 
€ 
Category
2 >80 80 50 40 20 
300,000 
€ 
600,000 
€ 
Category
3 >40 40 50 20 10 
150,000 
€ 
400,000 
€ 
        
 
Source of Data: Tuscany Region 
 
Managers and member firms can belong to more than one pole, but member firms can 
participate in a maximum of three poles.    
Each pole adopted its own three-year activities program of knowledge and technological 
transfer (2011-2014), with a specific business plan for the achievement of the following 
operational objectives: 
- to stimulate and to accept demand of innovation from the enterprises of the pole, 
and in general, from external enterprises which belong to the reference technology 
sector; 
- to accompany enterprises in the process of acquiring qualified services with high 
added value and to support the diffusion of innovation between enterprises inside 
and outside the pole; 
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- to facilitate to enterprises the access to scientific and technological knowledge, to 
facilitate the access to national and international networks, and to facilitate the 
access to funding sources; 
- to ensure the sharing of equipments and laboratories (Bellandi et al. 2014). 
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3.2 Data 
 
The dataset is the merger of the Bando per l’acquisizione di servizi qualificati dataset, the 
list of the member firms of the Poli di innovazione, and the AIDA dataset. 
The first one includes all the informations about the participants to the call for tender, 
which has been structured as an open call with 16 windows for the presentation of the 
financing requests (Table 5). 
Table 5 Deadlines of the Bando per l’acquisizione di servizi qualificati 
Deadlines 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
      
December31 March31 April30 April30 April30 April30 
 June30 August31 August31 August31 August31 
 September30 December31 December31 December31  
 December31     
      
 
Source of Data: Tuscany Region 
Qualified services are defined as “support services for the innovation, finalised to the 
improvement of the management, the production line, the organizational system or the 
marketing system of an enterprise” by the Tuscany Region. The Region has listed different 
types of services to whom an enterprise can require a subsidy, grouped into three main 
categories (Appendix A): 
- first level qualified services, 
- specialized qualified services, 
- internazionalization services. 
The informations contained in the dataset are referred to the enterprises which applied 
from 2008 to 2013. An enterprise could apply more than once – for different projects – 
with a maximum of two qualified services per project. On the whole, 2.638 enterprises 
received a subsidy for 3.597 services, with an admitted total investment of around 128 
millions of euro – and a total expenditure of around 71 millions of euro. Observations in 
the dataset are coded by project, with informations concerning the name of the enterprise 
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that applied to the call for tender, the name of the project, the day of the presentation, the 
type(s) of service(s) required, the amount of subsidy required, the result of the evaluation, 
the amount of the dispensed subsidy. 
The second dataset include the list of the members of the Poli di innovazione. The poles 
were launched in 2011, and the number of member firms was 1,685; in 2014, at the end of 
the policy period, the number of members was 3,912, an increase of 132% (Table 6). 
Table 6 Member firms of the twelve poles in 2011 and in 2014 
Pole Members (July 2011) 
Members 
(July 2014) 
% increase 
(2011-2014) 
Optoscana 67 92 37.31 
Innopaper 89 139 56.18 
Otir2020 223 501 124.66 
Scienze della Vita 41 158 285.37 
Pietre Toscane 52 122 134.62 
Penta 225 352 56.44 
Polis 228 643 182.02 
Nanoxm 70 128 82.86 
Cento 177 322 81.92 
Pierre 120 368 206.67 
Polo12 198 390 96.97 
Politer 195 697 257.44 
    
Total 1,685 3,912 132.17 
 
Source of Data: Tuscany Region 
The poles has been connected to the Bando per l’acquisizione di servizi qualificati by the 
Tuscany Region. To increase the memberships of the poles, a benefit for the members has 
been provided in the call for tender, changing the regulation in 2011. 
The third dataset include the list of the Tuscan enterprises extracted from AIDA, a 
commercial archive mantained by the Bureau Van Dijk. AIDA contains financial accouting 
data and other informations – business register code, geographic location, economic 
activity, etc. – on a large number of enterprises. This dataset is particularly helpful because 
it supplies micro-data for modelling dynamic economic behavior, especially at regional 
level. Data collection regards – for each firm – the business register code, the geographic 
location, the economic activity, the year of birth, the value added, the number of 
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employees, the labor costs, the amount of debts, the revenues, and the capital. Data are 
from 2009 to 2013 (unbalanced panel), and variables have been deflated.  
The construction of the final dataset has followed various steps. The aim of this research is 
to investigate the effect of the integrated system of Tuscan innovation policies (innovation 
poles plus the subsidies for the purchase of qualified services) on the firms’ performance. 
From the first dataset, it has been extracted a list of the firms subsidized in 2011: in this 
year the Poli di innovazione were launched, i.e. it is possibile to observe enteprises which 
received a “double” treatment – members of a pole and subsidized from the Bando per 
l’acquisizione di servizi qualificati. Moreover, choosing 2011 as reporting year allows to 
use firms’ financial accouting data for 2009-2010 (pre-treatment period) and 2012-2013 
(post-treatment period). Then, the firms which were also members of the poles hase been 
identified with a dummy variable. Finally, the informations extracted from the Bando per 
l’acquisizione di servizi qualificati and the list of the members of the poles have been 
attached to the dataset extracted from AIDA2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
2
 A clarification about the AIDA dataset is necessary. To avoid problems related to the evaluation process, 
the firms extracted from AIDA belong to the same industries of the firms funded in 2011 through the Bando 
per l’acquisizione di servizi qualificati. Obviously, the funded firms are a sub-group of the list extracted from 
AIDA, even if 91 firms on 573 have not been found in AIDA. AIDA is one of the largest dataset with 
accounting data of italian enterprises, but it does not include all the existing italian enterprises. 
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Figure 4 Periods of treatment, pre-treatment, and post-treatment 
 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
The enterprises included in the dataset belong to the following industries: mining and 
quarrying; manufacturing; electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply; water supply, 
sewerage, waste management and remediation activities; construction; wholesale and retail 
trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; transportation and storage; accomodation 
and food service activities; information and communication; real estate activities; 
professional, scientific and technical activities; administrative and support service 
activities; education; other service activities (Table 7). 
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Table 7 Number of firms grouped by economic activities (initial dataset) 
Category Frequency Percentage Cumulative 
Mining and quarrying 258 0.38 0.38 
Manufacturing 14,840 21.85 22.16 
Electricity, gas, and steam  549 0.81 22.97 
Water supply 376 0.55 23.52 
Construction 11,849 17.44 40.91 
Wholesale and retail trade 8,530 12.56 53.43 
Transportation and storage 2,439 3.59 57.01 
Accomodation and food service  3,775 5.56 62.56 
Information and communication 2,532 3.73 66.27 
Real estate activities 13,808 20.33 86.54 
Professional activities 5,063 7.45 93.97 
Administrative activities 2,715 4.00 97.96 
Education 532 0.78 98.74 
Other service activities 660 0.97 100.00 
 
Observations 
 
67,926 
 
100.00 
 
 
 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
This dataset has been modified to remove observations which were irrelevant for the 
analysis – and which could have negatively affected the evaluation process. In the first step 
observations without informations have been deleted, i.e. firms with the business register 
code, the geographic location, or the economic activity as unique information. This 
operation has deleted 1,256 firms. In the second step observations active from 2011 
onwards have been deleted, because of the lack of information on the years before the 
subsidization and the creation of the poles. This operation has deleted 9,178 firms. The last 
step has concerned the cancellation of observations with negative values for value added, 
raw materials, and capital. This operation has deleted 24,310 firms. The final dataset is an 
unbalanced panel of 33,182 firms, with 24,349 observations participating continuously 
from 2009 to 2013. Patterns of observations are showed in Table 8. 
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Table 8 Patterns of observations (final dataset) 
Pattern Frequency Percentage Cumulative Type of 
pattern 
     
Pattern1 24,349 73.38 73.38 11111 
Pattern2 1,793 5.40 78.78 . 1111 
Pattern3 1,578 4.76 83.54 11 . . . 
Pattern4 1,470 4.43 87.97 1111 . 
Pattern5 1,398 4.21 92.18 111 . . 
Pattern6 524 1.58 93.76 . . 111 
Pattern7 253 0.76 94.52 . . . 11 
Pattern8 246 0.74 95.27 . 1 . . . 
Pattern9 231 0.70 95.96 1 . . . . 
Pattern10 1,340 4.04 100 (others) 
     
Total 33,182 100.00   
 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
Table 9 illustrates the number of firms – grouped by economic activities – in the final 
dataset, with an additional classification by subsidization and involvement into the poles. 
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Table 9 Population, subsidized firms, and members of the poles 
 Population Subsidized firms (Bando Servizi) 
 N° obs. Percentage Cumulative N° obs. Mean Cumulative 
Mining and quarrying 143 0.43 0.43 4 0.99 0.99 
Manufacturing 8,784 26.47 26.90 243 60.00 60.99 
Electricity, gas, and steam  86 0.26 27.16 1 0.25 61.23 
Water supply 223 0.67 27.83 7 1.73 62.96 
Construction 5,184 15.62 43.46 53 13.09 76.05 
Wholesale and retail trade 4,416 13.31 56.77 5 1.23 77.28 
Transportation and storage 1,341 4.04 60.81 6 1.48 78.77 
Accomodation and food 
service  1,671 5.04 65.84 1 0.25 79.01 
Information and 
communication 1,510 4.55 70.39 40 9.88 88.89 
Real estate activities 5,899 17.78 88.17 1 0.25 89.14 
Professional activities 2,094 6.31 94.48 30 7.41 96.54 
Administrative activities 1,275 3.84 98.32 12 2.96 99.51 
Education 258 0.78 99.10 - - - 
Other service activities 298 0.90 100.00 2 0.49 100.00 
Total 33,182 100.00  405 100.00  
 
 Members of the poles Subsidized & Members 
 N° obs. Percentage Cumulative N° obs. Mean Cumulative 
Mining and quarrying 11 1.51 1.51 - - - 
Manufacturing 420 57.61 59.12 52 59.77 59.77 
Electricity, gas, and steam  3 0.41 59.53 - - - 
Water supply 3 0.41 59.95 - - - 
Construction 58 7.96 67.90 6 6.90 66.67 
Wholesale and retail trade 34 4.66 72.57 1 1.15 67.82 
Transportation and storage 12 1.65 74.21 - - - 
Accomodation and food 
service  1 0.14 74.35 - - - 
Information and 
communication 64 8.78 83.13 16 18.39 86.21 
Real estate activities 2 0.27 83.40 - - - 
Professional activities 103 14.13 97.53 12 13.79 100.00 
Administrative activities 10 1.37 98.90 - - - 
Education 8 1.10 100.00 - - - 
Other service activities - -   - - - 
Total 729 100.00  87 100.00  
 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration  
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3.3 Empirical strategy and results 
 
3.3.1. Evaluation of R&D subsidies on performance 
 
As discussed in the Introduction, many studies have explored the effects of R&D subsidies 
on economic performance at firm level, reaching different results. This topic has been 
widely explored and it has been demonstrated that factors such as firm heterogeneity, 
simultaneity of input and output decisions, measurement errors and business cycle may 
introduce bias into the empirical results (Brasini and Freo 2011). Many characteristics can 
affect firm performance, and for this reason the effect of a treatment – in this case, the 
financing obtained through the Bando per l’acquisizione di servizi qualificati and being a 
member of a pole – should be disentangled by firm heterogeneity. Knowing what would 
happened to the treated firms if they had not been treated allows to properly estimate this 
effect, but in the social sciences it is impossibile to observe both outcomes for the same 
firm at the same time.     
To solve this problem, propensity score matching and difference-in-differences evaluation 
are used to investigate the relationship between innovation policies and productivity. The 
basic idea behind this method is to create a counterfactual unobservable comparison group, 
matching treated firms with not treated firms, and to compare the outcomes of the two 
groups controlling for systematic difference by applying difference-in-differences. 
Matching and difference-in-differences provide accurate estimates, because this approach 
aims at addressing endogeneity. Matching provides a key missing control group that gives 
information on the behavoir of treated firms if they had not been treated, and that decreases 
the endogeneity bias linked to the self-selection of the firms which participated to the 
Tuscan innovation policies. Difference-in-differences takes into account for time trends, 
and reduces the endogeneity related to the natural propensity of firms to grow (Arnold and 
Javorcik 2009, Sissoko 2013). 
Three different models have been built to assess the effect of the innovation policies 
implemented by the Tuscany Region: 
66 
 
- a combined propensity score matching/difference-in-differences model to evaluate 
the economic impact of the subsidies distributed through the Bando per 
l’acquisizione di servizi qualificati3; 
- a combined propensity score matching/difference-in-differences model to evaluate 
the economic impact of the Poli di innovazione; 
- a combined propensity score matching/difference-in-differences model to evaluate 
the economic impact of the above subsidies on the members of the Poli di 
innovazione; 
- a regression model to evaluate the network’s effect on the economic performance of 
the firms.  
In each model, the pre-treatment period is the two-year period 2009-2010, while the post-
treatment period is the two-year period 2012-2013. Variables are computed as means of the 
two-year pre and post period. 
  
3.3.2. Estimation of firm productivity 
 
The Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is widely recognized as a performance benchmark to 
measure the rate of performance of firms over time. Robert Solow (1957) demonstrated 
that the output growth of a firm can be decomposed into the contribution of input growth 
and a residual productivity term. TFP growth is usually measured by the Solow residual: 
let gY denote the growth rate of aggregate output, gK the growth rate of aggregate capital, 
gL the growth rate of aggregate labor and α the capital share, the Solow residual (Sr) is then 
defined as: 
\] 	= 	>^ 	− 	>_ 	− 	(1	 − 	)>` ( 37 )   
                                                             
3
 I do not use the, as control group, the firms which applied to the call for tender but did not receive the 
subsidy: in 2011 the number of subsidized firms – compared to the total number of requests – was around 
90%. 
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The Solow residual accurately measures TFP growth if the production function is 
neoclassical, there is perfect competition in factor markets, and the growth rates of the 
inputs are measured accurately. 
During the 1980s, the National Bureau of Economic Research was the first to start a 
systematic survey of the sectorial TFP in the United States (Gullickson and Harper 1987). 
In the 1990s, the number of the studies on the TFP increases quickly, although there are 
still some criticism to the use of this indicator. Hulten (2001) points out three general 
criticisms: 
- the assumption of constant returns to scale is needed to estimate the return to capital 
as a residual, but if another measure is used in constructing the share weights, the 
residual can be derived without the assumption of constant returns; 
- the assumption of marginal cost pricing is too restrictive: when imperfect 
competition leads to a price greater than marginal cost the residual yields a biased 
estimate of the Hicksian shift parameter of the production function; 
- the assumption that innovation improves the marginal productivity of all inputs 
equally is too strong. 
In this research, it is used the method developed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to 
estimate the productivity function. Classical OLS estimates of production functions – and 
productivity – are biased when productive shocks lead firms to decrease or increase their 
input usage. To solve this problem, Olley and Pakes (1996) develop an estimator that use 
investments as a proxy for these unobservables shocks. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
extend this idea, using intermediate inputs – electricity or raw materials – instead of 
investments. There are three main benefits of using this approach. The first is strictly data 
driven: investment proxy is only valid for plants with nonzero investment, while 
intermediate inputs are almost always reported by active firms. The second benefit is that 
for a firm it is less costly to adjust the intermediate inputs – instead of investments – to 
respond to a productivity shock. The last benefit is that intermediate inputs are not 
typically state variables. 
For the productivity estimation, the production technology is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas: 
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7 	= 	 β 	+	βal7 +	βTk7 	+	βdm7		 +	ω7 	+ 	η7 ( 38 )   
where Yt is the logarithm of the firm’s output, measured as value added (also gross revenue 
is allowed as firm’s output), lt and mt are the logarithm of the freely variable inputs labor 
and the intermediate input, and kt is the logarithm of the capital. The error has two 
components: ωt, the transmitted productivity component, and ηt, an error term that is 
uncorrelated with input choices. 
The demand for the intermediate input mt is assumed to depend on the firm’s state 
variables kt and ωt: 
h7 	= 	h7(Z7, ω7) ( 39 )   
Levinsohn and Petrin show that the demand function is monotonically increasing in ωt, and 
this allows inversion of the intermediate demand function, in order to identify 
unobservable productivity term as a function of two observed inputs: 
ω7 	= 	ω7(Z7, m7) ( 40 )   
Finally, they assume that productivity is governed by a first-order Markov process: 
ω7 	= 	 E[ω7|ω7] 	+ 	ξ7 ( 41 )   
where ξt is an innovation to productivity that is uncorrelated with kt, but not necessarily 
with lt (Levinsohn and Petrin 2003). 
The estimation is structured in three steps. In this case, value added has been chosen as 
firm’s output. In the first step, given the production function: 
Y7 	= 	 β 	+	βal7 +	βTk7 	+	βdm7		 +	ω7 	+ 	η7 	= 	 βal7 	+	φ7(Z7, h7) 	+ 	η7 ( 42 )   
where 
φ7(Z7, h7) 		= 	 β 	+ 	βTk7 	+ 	ω7(Z7, h7) ( 43 )   
substituting a third-order polynomial approximation in kt and mt in place of ϕt(kt, mt) 
makes it possible to consistently estimate parameters of the value added equation using 
OLS: 
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7	 		= 	 m + βan7 	+ JJδM	Z7h7M
p
MS
p
	S	
	+ 	η7 ( 44 )   
To estimate βk it is necessary to compute the estimated value for ϕt using 
φ7q 		= 	7		−	βar n7 ( 45 )   
For any candidate value βk it is possible to compute (up to a scalar constant) a prediction 
for ωt for all periods t using 
ω7q 	= 	φ7	q 	−	βTZ7 ( 46 )   
Using these values, a consistent – nonparametric – approximation to E[ωt|ωt−1] is given 
by the predicted values from the regression 
ω7q 	= 	γ 	+ 	γω7 +	γ!ω!7 	+	γpωp7 	+	ϵ7 ( 47 )   
Given the estimated values of βl, βk, and E[ωt|ωt − 1], the estimate of βk is defined as the 
solution to 
hUuvw 	J(7	 	− 	βar n7 	− 	βTZ7 	− 	[ω7|ω75 ])² ( 48 )   
Another productivity measure used in this research is the Labor Productivity (LP), defined 
as the ratio among value added and the number of employees per year. Many studies 
highlight the existence of a positive correlation between innovation and LP (Apergis et al. 
2008, Hall 2011), and this relationship assume great relevance in this study because 
Tuscan innovation policies indirectly – and sometimes directly – operate on human capital. 
 
3.3.3. Innovation policies effect on productivity  
 
The apparent differences among the groups of firms included within the dataset – those 
subsidized through the call for tender Bando per l’acquisizione di servizi qualificati in 
2011, the members of the poles, the group of firms resulting from the combination of these 
two policies, and the not treated firms – say little about the direction of causality (Table 
10).  The application of the methodology proposed in Paragraph 3.3.1 will provide more 
insight for the causality attribution to the specific policies. 
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Table 10 Summary statistics 
 Subsidized pre-treatment Subsidized post-treatment 
Variables N° obs. Mean Std. Dev. N° obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Age 405 16.86 13.08 405 19.86 13.08 
Revenues (thousands €) 398 5,970 8,739 390 6,739 11,500 
Employees 363 23.41 40.15 386 30.29 55.53 
Intermediate inputs 
(thousands €) 398 2,619 5,173 390 3,170 7,993 
Wages (thousands €) 398 1,011 1,304 390 1,129 1,511 
Capital (thousands €) 398 1,782 4,042 390 1,773 3,769 
Value added (thousands €) 398 1,496 1,894 390 1,648 2,270 
Debts (thousands €) 398 3,933 6,414 390 4,154 6,473 
 Members pre-treatment Members post-treatment 
Variables N° obs. Mean Std. Dev. N° obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Age 729 18.08 14.13 729 21.08 14.13 
Revenues (thousands €) 716 15,700 143,000 695 16,100 144,000 
Employees 654 47.65 248.28 690 44.33 166.69 
Intermediate inputs 
(thousands €) 716 7,283 63,100 695 10,400 116,000 
Wages (thousands €) 716 2,476 18,100 695 2,185 14,300 
Capital (thousands €) 716 4,922 46,100 695 2,982 12,800 
Value added (thousands €) 716 3,898 36,400 695 2,983 19,700 
Debts (thousands €) 716 12,800 130,000 695 17,800 300,000 
 Subsidized & members pre-treatment Subsidized & members post-treatment 
Variables  N° obs. Mean Std. Dev. N° obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Age 87 17.58 14.23 87 20.58 14.23 
Revenues (thousands €) 87 5,790 8,752 85 7,868 17,100 
Employees 81 26.79 35.69 84 29.26 34.04 
Intermediate inputs 
(thousands €) 87 2,514 5,182 85 4,130 13,300 
Wages (thousands €) 87 1,044 1,339 85 1,169 1,502 
Capital (thousands €) 87 1,313 2,579 85 1,315 2,496 
Value added (thousands €) 87 1,518 2,003 85 1,876 2,780 
Debts (thousands €) 87 3,305 4,489 85 3,802 5,545 
 Not treated pre-treatment Not treated post-treatment 
Variables  N° obs. Mean Std. Dev. N° obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Age 32,135 13.60 12.38 32,135 16.60 12.38 
Revenues (thousands €) 30,807 2,540 24,900 28,409 2,753 27,200 
Employees 28,966 6.89 63.89 27,913 9.97 62.29 
Intermediate inputs 
(thousands €) 30,809 1,301 18,800 28,409 1,477 21,700 
Wages (thousands €) 30,809 330 2,621 28,409 349 2,478 
Capital (thousands €) 30,954 1,267 20,400 28,409 1,251 19,600 
Value added (thousands €) 30,953 560 5,482 28,409 586 5,633 
Debts (thousands €) 30,956 2,164 27,000 28,409 2,212 29,100 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
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In order to implement propensity score matching, the probability of being treated needs to 
be modeled empirically. Three different models have been created, one for each group of 
firms exposed to the different innovation policies implemented by the Tuscany Region. 
In the first case – firms subsidized through the Bando per l’acquisizione di servizi 
qualificati – a probit model is estimated in order to assess the probability to receive a R&D 
subsidy, with observable firms characteristics in the pre-treatment period as explanatory 
variables. The underlying assumption for the validity of the procedure is that, conditional 
on the observable characteristics that are relevant for the subsidiation – excluding the 
quality of the project – potential outcomes for the treated and the not treated are 
independent to the treatment4. 
Table 11 Probit results, predicting the probability to be subsidized through the Bando per 
l’acquisizione di servizi qualificati (first model) 
Variables Mechanical 
firm 
Manufacturing 
firm 
Services firm 
    
Agepre 0.0150 -0.00113 0.00562 
 (0.0173) (0.00753) (0.00938) 
Age
 pre
 2
 -0.000217 1.98e-05 -0.000175 
 (0.000331) (0.000121) (0.000193) 
Revenuespre -2.15e-08 -4.55e-09 8.13e-11 
 (2.26e-08) (5.73e-09) (7.47e-09) 
Intermediate inputspre 2.46e-08 8.83e-10 -2.65e-08 
 (2.86e-08) (8.41e-09) (1.71e-08) 
Debtspre 1.17e-09 8.34e-10 -5.45e-09 
 (1.47e-08) (2.59e-09) (7.62e-09) 
LPpre -1.129*** -0.859*** -0.993*** 
 (0.319) (0.195) (0.150) 
TFPpre 1.387*** 1.298*** 1.301*** 
 (0.358) (0.210) (0.175) 
Intercept -4.222*** -6.012*** -4.973*** 
 (1.570) (0.825) (0.637) 
    
Observations 1,215 4,111 9,488 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
                                                             
4
 The choice of covariates is influenced by the empirical literature on R&D subsidy policies (Girma et al. 
2007, Bronzini and Iachini 2011, Sissoko 2013). 
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Data presented in Table 11 suggest the presence of differences between treated and not 
treated, for mechanical, manufacturing and services firms. Variables are referred to the 
pre-treatment period. Younger mechanical and services firms – identified by the variable 
“Agepre2” – are more likely to be not subsidized, even if the difference is almost zero; it 
means that old and structured firms are considered more reliable than firms with less 
experience. Small firms, in terms of “Revenuespre”, are more likely to be subsidized if they 
are mechanical and manufacturing. Productive firms, in terms of TFP in the pre-treatment 
period, are also more likely to be subsidized, differently from organizations which had an 
high LP in the pre-treatment period. 
The predicted probability of being subsidized, or propensity score, resulting from the 
model in Table 11, forms the basis of the matching procedure. To assess how well the 
propensity score matching performs, it has been calculated the difference between the 
treated and the controls in terms of each of the above variables and it has been run a simple 
t-tests on the differences. This is a necessary condition for the balancing hypothesis 
(Dehejia and Wahba 2002). No statistically significant differences have been found 
between the treated and control group in terms of all the above variables. 
After testing the balancing hypothesis, to estimate the Average Treatment effect on the 
Treated (ATT) in terms of Total Factor Productivity and Labor Productivity it has been 
used the Radius Matching (RM), using two different radius (0.0005 and 0.0002). It has 
been computed both restricting the analysis over the common support and not. As a 
robustness check, in order to control for industry-specific effects, the ATT is computed for 
three different types of firms: mechanical firms, manufacturing firms, and services firms. 
The ATT is estimated using the next equations: 

8yGzR 	= 	J[(
{8
7 	− 	7	) 	− 	JLM
{:
(M7 	− 	M7	)]	O  ( 49 )   

` GzR 	= 	J[(
{8
7 	−	7	) 	− 	JLM
{:
(M7 	− 	M7	)]	O 
( 50 )   
where T stands for Treated group, C for non treated (Comparison) group, 7  and 7	  are 
the outcomes of (treated) firm i after – and before – the programme time period, M7  and 
M7	  are the outcomes of (non treated) firm j after – and before – the programme time 
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period, Wij is the weight placed on comparison observation j for firm i, wi account for the 
reweighting that reconstructs the outcome distribution for the treated sample. 
Table 12 Estimation results of the first model (treatment: subsidized firms), with different 
Radius Matching (0.0005 and 0.0002 as radius), grouped by economic activities 
 RADIUS 0.0005 RADIUS 0.0002 
 CS NCS CS NCS 
  LP TFP LP TFP LP TFP LP TFP 
Mechanical 
firms 
0.129 
(0.056) 
0.110 
(0.052) 
0.128 
(0.056) 
0.107 
(0.052) 
0.117 
(0.066) 
0.092 
(0.061) 
0.122 
(0.066) 
0.096 
(0.061) 
Treated 36 36 36 36 31 31 31 31 
Control group 346 346 361 361 155 155 161 161 
T-test 2.308 2.093 2.303 2.057 1.783 1.517 1.859 1.583 
Manufacturing 
firms 
0.080 
(0.040) 
0.070 
(0.038) 
0.079 
(0.040) 
0.069 
(0.038) 
0.093 
(0.041) 
0.083 
(0.039) 
0.091 
(0.041) 
0.081 
(0.039) 
Treated 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 
Control group 2,423 2,423 2,445 2,445 1,363 1,363 1,371 1,371 
T-test 1.993 1.821 1.983 1.807 2.272 2.122 2.209 2.064 
Services 
firms 
0.076 
(0.051) 
0.075 
(0.044) 
0.072 
(0.051) 
0.071 
(0.044) 
0.076 
(0.052) 
0.074 
(0.045) 
0.072 
(0.052) 
0.069 
(0.045) 
Treated 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 
Control group 6,918 6,918 7,017 7,017 4,628 4,628 4,675 4,675 
T-test 1.477 1.699 1.407 1.613 1.471 1.656 1.381 1.551 
Legend: 
NN = Nearest Neighbor 
RM = Radius Matching 
CS = Common Support 
NCS = No Common Support 
Standard errors in brackets 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
 
Using different radius produces different results – even if the gap is not particularly 
elevated. Both mechanical, manufacturing and services firms have positive increases of 
TFP and LP when the ATT is calculated both over the common support and not. 
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Mechanical firms show the best results in terms of TFP and LP increases, while services 
firms show positive but not statistically significant results. Estimates for manufacturing 
firms, in terms of statistically significance, have a better result when the radius is fixed to 
0.0002. While analyzing these results, a caveat is necessary. The group of services firms 
include industries with different specializations, and different business-cycle trends: e.g., 
the textile sector is one of the most relevan in Tuscany but in the last year it suffered a long 
crisis, while other sectors – like the renewable energy sector – grown considerably, and 
this situation could affect the ATT estimates.  
In the second case – members of the Poli di innovazione as treated – it has been calculated 
a probit model of the binary outcome “poles membership” (Table 13). 
Table 13 Probit results, predicting the probability to be a member of the Poli di 
innovazione (second model) 
Variables Mechanical 
firm 
Manufacturing 
firm 
Services firm 
    
Agepre 0.00628 0.00299 0.0137** 
 (0.0110) (0.00676) (0.00577) 
Age
 pre
 2
 3.52e-05 -1.84e-05 -0.000149 
 (0.000188) (0.000110) (9.58e-05) 
Revenuespre -3.84e-09 -1.21e-09 -2.66e-09 
 (7.63e-09) (2.76e-09) (2.39e-09) 
Intermediate inputspre -2.16e-09 1.86e-09 -5.46e-10 
 (6.76e-09) (3.15e-09) (2.12e-09) 
Debtspre 5.48e-09 1.56e-09 2.26e-09 
 (7.14e-09) (1.63e-09) (1.44e-09) 
LPpre -1.084*** -0.764*** -0.496*** 
 (0.218) (0.163) (0.107) 
TFPpre 1.552*** 1.039*** 0.703*** 
 (0.236) (0.170) (0.120) 
Intercept -5.951*** -4.275*** -4.067*** 
 (1.110) (0.672) (0.453) 
 
   
Observations 1,215 4,111 9,488 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
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Old firms – variable “Agepre” – seem to be more likely to become members of the poles, as 
well as small firms – in terms of “Revenuespre”. Like in the previous case, firms with low 
levels of LP and high levels of TFP have an highest probability of being treated. 
To test for the balancing hypothesis, it has been computed the difference between the 
treated and the controls in terms of the above variables and it has been run a simple t-tests 
on the differences. No statistically significant differences have been found between the 
treated and the control groups. 
The ATT can be estimated using the next equations: 

8yG|}a~ 	= 	J[(
{8
7 	−	7	) 	− 	JLM
{:
(M7 	− 	M7	)]	O ( 51 )   

` G|}a~ 	= 	J[(
{8
7 	− 	7	) 	− 	JLM
{:
(M7 	− 	M7	)]	O 
( 52 )   
where T stands for Treated group, C for non treated (Comparison) group, 7  and 7	  are 
the outcomes of (treated) firm i after – and before – the programme time period, M7  and 
M7	  are the outcomes of (non treated) firm j after – and before – the programme time 
period, Wij is the weight placed on comparison observation j for firm i, wi account for the 
reweighting that reconstructs the outcome distribution for the treated sample. 
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Table 14 Estimation results of the second model (treatment: members of the poles), with 
different Radius Matching (0.0005 and 0.0002 as radius), grouped by economic activities 
 RADIUS 0.0005 RADIUS 0.0002 
 CS NCS CS NCS 
  LP TFP LP TFP LP TFP LP TFP 
Mechanical 
firms 
0.061 
(0.056) 
0.050 
(0.051) 
0.061 
(0.056) 
0.050 
(0.050) 
0.068 
(0.074) 
0.061 
(0.066) 
0.068 
(0.074) 
0.061 
(0.066) 
Treated 72 72 72 72 59 59 59 59 
Control group 307 307 309 309 139 139 139 139 
T-test 1.088 0.990 1.089 0.983 0.928 0.923 0.928 0.923 
Manufacturing 
firms 
-0.006 
(0.039) 
-0.009 
(0.037) 
-0.001 
(0.039) 
-0.003 
(0.037) 
-0.002 
(0.041) 
-0.004 
(0.039) 
-0.002 
(0.041) 
-0.004 
(0.039) 
Treated 178 178 179 179 169 169 169 169 
Control group 2,886 2,886 2,887 2,887 1,765 1,765 1,765 1,765 
T-test -0.161 -0.233 -0.026 -0.080 -0.059 -0.115 -0.059 -0.115 
Services 
firms 
0.091 
(0.039) 
0.092 
(0.034) 
0.091 
(0.039) 
0.092 
(0.034) 
0.093 
(0.039) 
0.094 
(0.035) 
0.093 
(0.039) 
0.093 
(0.035) 
Treated 185 185 185 185 183 183 183 183 
Control group 7,519 7,519 7,554 7,554 6,640 6,640 6,657 6,657 
T-test 2.357 2.686 2.348 2.674 2.375 2.692 2.367 2.682 
Legend: 
NN = Nearest Neighbor 
RM = Radius Matching 
CS = Common Support 
NCS = No Common Support 
Standard errors in brackets 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
 
Excluding mechanical firms, in which the gap between the models with different radius is 
around 10% percentage points, using different radius leads to similar results. The ATT in 
terms of TFP and LP is lower compared to the previous case: furthermore, for 
manufacturing firms it is negative. Results are not statistically significant, except for the 
increase of TFP and LP of services firms. It probably means that the Poli di innovazione 
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are stimulating environments for high-qualified organizations – services firms – which are 
very receptive to share knowledge and informations, but their effect on traditional – 
manufacturing – productions is limited. 
In the third case – members of the poles which have been subsidized – the probit model 
accounts for the probability of receive a R&D subsidy for the members of the Poli di 
innovazione. In this case, a membership should have facilitate the path of the firms in the 
call for tender, generating a double benefit: 
- to the firms, which receive the subsidy and improve their performance, 
- to the pole, which increases the number of members thanks to the advertising effect 
of the success in the call for tender. 
Table 15 Probit results, predicting the probability of being subsidized for the members of 
the Poli di innovazione (third model) 
Variables Mechanical 
firm 
Manufacturing 
firm 
Services firm 
    
Agepre 0.0280 0.00326 -0.00323 
 (0.0291) (0.0127) (0.0158) 
Age
 pre
 2
 -0.000318 2.86e-06 -4.91e-05 
 (0.000533) (0.000191) (0.000330) 
Revenuespre 3.50e-09 -8.37e-09 4.69e-09 
 (2.42e-08) (1.75e-08) (1.35e-08) 
Intermediate inputspre -5.36e-08 7.05e-09 -2.51e-08 
 (6.67e-08) (1.86e-08) (3.04e-08) 
Debtspre 1.13e-08 -2.89e-09 -1.15e-08 
 (2.33e-08) (1.16e-08) (1.95e-08) 
LPpre -1.413*** -0.846** -0.750*** 
 (0.423) (0.366) (0.252) 
TFPpre 1.465*** 1.299*** 1.014*** 
 (0.457) (0.411) (0.292) 
Intercept -2.747 -6.858*** -5.044*** 
 (2.422) (1.555) (1.080) 
    
Observations 1,215 4,111 9,488 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
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The results of the third probit model are different from the first and the second model, but 
also in this case firms with low levels of LP and high levels of TFP are more sensitive to 
receive a subsidy if they are members of a pole. To control for the balancing hypothesis of 
the propensity score, it has been calculated the difference between treated and controls in 
terms of each of the variables in Table 15, and it has been run a simple t-tests on the 
differences. No statistically significant differences have been found between the treated 
and control group in terms of the above variables. 
Unfortunately, the number of treated is very low: as showed in Table 16, there are less then 
100 members of the poles which have received a subsidy. Estimates of the ATT have been 
obtained through the following equations: 

8yGzR&|}a~ 	= 	J[(
{8
7 	−	7	) 	− 	JLM
{:
(M7 	− 	M7	)]	O ( 53 )   

` GzR&|}a~ 	= 	J[(
{8
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{:
(M7 	− 	M7	)]	O 
( 54 )   
 
In equation ( 53 ) and equation ( 54 ) T stands for Treated group, C for non treated 
(Comparison) group, 7  and 7	  are the outcomes of (treated) firm i after – and before – 
the programme time period, M7  and M7	  are the outcomes of (non treated) firm j after – 
and before – the programme time period, Wij is the weight placed on comparison 
observation j for firm i, wi account for the reweighting that reconstructs the outcome 
distribution for the treated sample. The effect of subsidies for poles’ members on LP and 
TFP are positive and particularly high for mechanical firms and services firms, and 
positive but not particularly high for manufacturing firms. Estimates for mechanical and 
services firms are also statistically significant, both with a radius equal to 0.0005 and 
0.0002. 
 
 
 
 
79 
 
Table 16 Estimation results of the third model (treatment: firms subsidized and members of 
the poles), with different Radius Matching (0.0005 and 0.0002 as radius), grouped by 
economic activities 
 RADIUS 0.0005 RADIUS 0.0002 
 CS NCS CS NCS 
  LP TFP LP TFP LP TFP LP TFP 
Mechanical 
firms 
0.532 
(0.146) 
0.456 
(0.127) 
0.676 
(0.143) 
0.561 
(0.124) 
0.590 
(0.151) 
0.516 
(0.131) 
0.652 
(0.145) 
0.544 
(0.126) 
Treated 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Control group 151 151 273 273 68 68 113 113 
T-test 3.649 3.580 4.740 4.539 3.907 3.938 4.489 4.320 
Manufacturing 
firms 
0.096 
(0.073) 
0.093 
(0.077) 
0.098 
(0.073) 
0.094 
(0.077) 
0.098 
(0.073) 
0.094 
(0.077) 
0.098 
(0.073) 
0.093 
(0.077) 
Treated 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Control group 2,434 2,434 2,619 2,619 1,263 1,263 1,343 1,343 
T-test 1.314 1.210 1.346 1.228 1.336 1.223 1.339 1.206 
Services 
firms 
0.241 
(0.096) 
0.230 
(0.087) 
0.240 
(0.096) 
0.228 
(0.087) 
0.250 
(0.099) 
0.245 
(0.089) 
0.250 
(0.099) 
0.244 
(0.089) 
Treated 24 24 24 24 23 23 23 23 
Control group 6,245 6,245 7,269 7,269 4,962 4,962 5,393 5,393 
T-test 2.512 2.657 2.506 2.636 2.516 2.765 2.519 2.753 
Legend: 
NN = Nearest Neighbor 
RM = Radius Matching 
CS = Common Support 
NCS = No Common Support 
Standard errors in brackets 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
 
3.3.4. Network effect 
 
The last step of the analysis concerns the use of Social Network Analysis (SNA) to assess 
the impact of the innovation policies implemented by Tuscany Region. An econometric 
model which includes centrality indicator(s) can test whether a policy have had an impact 
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on inter-organizational networks, which are in turn held responsible for the effectiveness of 
the programme (Giuliani and Pietrobelli 2011).  
The effect of multiple policies can be additive or – on the contrary – a policy can interfere 
with another policy. As shown in the previous models, it seems that the Poli di innovazione 
have been effective in combination with the subsidies provided by the Bando per 
l’acquisizione di servizi qualificati, but, due to the lack of observations and the complexity 
in extracting their effective contribution from the total effect, the presence of a “pole 
effect” related to the connections of the poles is not totally verified. 
SNA helps to test the effect of the network structure on the firm’s performance. A 
clarification about the model which is going to be used is necessary: the dataset of the 
Innovation poles allows to identify which firms were included in 2011, but not their 
relationships. It is not possibile to create a map of the network based on the exchanges of 
resources among firms, but it is possibile to create a map of the network based on the 
exchanges among poles. The twelve poles have activated a large number of agents – 
employees and consultants – in the development of the knowledge and technological 
transfer system. Moreover, they have shared laboratories and incubators to support the 
diffusion of innovation and to stimulate innovative processes within enterprises. The more 
connections owned by a pole, the higher is the opportunity – for an enterprise – to access to 
knowledge and technological sharing. 
Figure 5, Figure 6, Figure 7, Figure 8 and Figure 9 illustrate the graphs of, respectively, the 
sharing of consultants, the sharing of employees, the sharing of laboratories, the sharing of 
incubators, and the sum of these networks. If a pole shares one of these elements with 
another pole, they have a linkage. Linkages are weighted by the number of shared elements 
(weights in Figure 9 are re-scaled for a better representation). Each pole is classified by its 
category (Table 4): blue squares are the poles which belong to the category 1, red squares 
are the poles which belong to the category 2, green squares are the poles which belong to 
the category 3. 
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Figure 5 Network of shared consultants among the twelve poles (line widths are based on 
tie strength) 
 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
Figure 6 Network of shared employees among the twelve poles (line widths are based on 
tie strength) 
 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
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Figure 7 Network of shared laboratories among the twelve poles (line widths are based on 
tie strength) 
 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
Figure 8 Network of shared incubators among the twelve poles (line widths are based on 
tie strength) 
 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
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Figure 9 Network of total connections – consultants, employees, laboratories, incubators – 
among the twelve poles (line widths are based on tie strength) 
 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
The adjacency matrices of the different networks have been created computing the number 
of consultants, employees, laboratories, and incubators in common to each couple of poles 
– and the sum of these sharings for the total network. Weights have been used to highlight 
the strenght of the relationships: they are equal to zero in some cases, while in others they 
are very relevant (Appendix B). The intensity of the relationships depends on two factors: 
- the dimension of the pole (bigger poles in terms of human resources or 
infrastructures are more likely to share their assets with others), 
- the sector(s) of activity (poles which belong to a similar sector are more likely to 
share their assets because of a common vision, and a common “language”). 
Five centrality measures have been computed for these networks: degree, Bonacich power 
(beta-centrality), closeness, eigenvector and betweenness (Table 17, Table 18, Table 19, 
Table 20,  
 
 
Table 21). Values have been normalized. For each firm, these variables take the value of 
the centrality measure computed for the pole they belong to. In case of multiple 
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memberships – firms had the opportunity to join more than one pole, even if a threshold5 
was imposed in 2011 – it has been assigned the value of the pole with the best score. 
Table 17 Centrality measures (consultants network) 
Pole Degree Bonacich Power Closeness Eigenvector Betweenness 
Optoscana 0.091 0.025 0.333 0.000 0.000 
Innopaper 0.182 5.997 0.367 0.707 0.000 
Otir2020 0.182 0.166 0.355 0.000 0.000 
Scienze della Vita 0.091 0.025 0.333 0.000 0.000 
Pietre Toscane 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.000 0.000 
Penta 0.273 8.483 0.379 1.000 0.018 
Polis 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.000 0.000 
Nanoxm 0.091 0.025 0.333 0.000 0.000 
Cento 0.182 5.997 0.367 0.707 0.000 
Pierre 0.182 0.166 0.355 0.000 0.000 
Polo12 0.182 0.166 0.355 0.000 0.000 
Politer 0.182 0.166 0.355 0.000 0.000 
      
Mean 0.137 1.768 0.350 0.201 0.002 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
Table 18 Centrality measures (employees network) 
Pole Degree Bonacich Power Closeness Eigenvector Betweenness 
Optoscana 0.455 2.846 0.524 0.336 0.000 
Innopaper 0.273 1.536 0.478 0.181 0.000 
Otir2020 0.636 3.974 0.611 0.469 0.019 
Scienze della Vita 0.364 2.195 0.524 0.259 0.000 
Pietre Toscane 0.091 0.003 0.250 0.000 0.000 
Penta 0.273 1.310 0.458 0.154 0.000 
Polis 0.818 4.671 0.688 0.551 0.093 
Nanoxm 0.545 3.521 0.579 0.415 0.004 
Cento 0.636 3.664 0.611 0.432 0.057 
Pierre 0.818 4.551 0.688 0.536 0.127 
Polo12 0.727 4.257 0.647 0.502 0.044 
Politer 0.909 4.974 0.733 0.586 0.147 
      
Mean 0.545 3.125 0.566 0.368 0.041 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
                                                             
5
 Three poles, but sometimes it has not been respected. 
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Table 19 Centrality measures (laboratories network) 
Pole Degree Bonacich Power Closeness Eigenvector Betweenness 
Optoscana 0.455 3.925 0.579 0.463 0.045 
Innopaper 0.273 2.165 0.524 0.255 0.000 
Otir2020 0.273 1.106 0.440 0.129 0.000 
Scienze della Vita 0.182 0.894 0.407 0.105 0.000 
Pietre Toscane 0.273 2.371 0.478 0.280 0.000 
Penta 0.273 1.106 0.440 0.129 0.000 
Polis 0.818 6.045 0.786 0.713 0.321 
Nanoxm 0.364 3.261 0.524 0.385 0.000 
Cento 0.636 3.992 0.688 0.469 0.367 
Pierre 0.636 4.951 0.611 0.584 0.094 
Polo12 0.545 4.131 0.647 0.487 0.227 
Politer 0.364 3.217 0.500 0.380 0.000 
      
Mean 0.424 3.097 0.552 0.365 0.088 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
Table 20 Centrality measures (incubators network) 
Pole Degree Bonacich Power Closeness Eigenvector Betweenness 
Optoscana 0.000 0.000 0.250 0.000 0.000 
Innopaper 0.091 0.007 0.250 0.000 0.000 
Otir2020 0.364 5.037 0.379 0.595 0.000 
Scienze della Vita 0.273 1.593 0.355 0.184 0.000 
Pietre Toscane 0.091 0.007 0.250 0.000 0.000 
Penta 0.364 5.037 0.379 0.595 0.000 
Polis 0.273 2.830 0.393 0.333 0.027 
Nanoxm 0.000 0.000 0.250 0.000 0.000 
Cento 0.455 5.698 0.393 0.673 0.045 
Pierre 0.455 5.881 0.423 0.694 0.136 
Polo12 0.273 1.593 0.355 0.184 0.000 
Politer 0.455 3.621 0.423 0.423 0.191 
      
Mean 0.258 2.609 0.342 0.307 0.033 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
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Table 21 Centrality measures (total network) 
Pole Degree Bonacich Power Closeness Eigenvector Betweenness 
Optoscana 0.636 3.536 0.688 0.417 0.000 
Innopaper 0.455 2.101 0.611 0.247 0.009 
Otir2020 0.727 3.787 0.733 0.446 0.021 
Scienze della Vita 0.364 1.805 0.579 0.213 0.000 
Pietre Toscane 0.273 1.225 0.55 0.144 0.000 
Penta 0.455 2.055 0.611 0.242 0.009 
Polis 0.909 4.310 0.846 0.508 0.107 
Nanoxm 0.545 3.012 0.647 0.355 0.000 
Cento 0.909 4.410 0.846 0.520 0.065 
Pierre 1.000 4.525 0.917 0.533 0.177 
Polo12 0.818 4.124 0.786 0.486 0.038 
Politer 0.909 4.38 0.846 0.516 0.083 
      
Mean 0.667 3.273 0.722 0.386 0.042 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
Correlations between these measures are illustrated in Appendix C. The finding that central 
network positions are associated with power has been widely demonstrated, because actors 
in central positions have access to – and control over – relevant resources (Krackhardt and 
Brass 1994). To assess the network position effect on the economic performance of the 
enterprises, it has been estimated a quantile regression model in which the independent 
variable is a measure of centrality 6  and the dependent variable is a measure of 
performance. 
The population is composed by the firms which have received a subsidy (first treatment), 
in order to test whether a membership to a central pole has an additive effect on subsidized 
firms or not. The dependent variable and the independent variable have been created as 
follows. 
Controlling for correlations between centrality measures of the different networks, it has 
emerged that these variables are highly correlated. To avoid multicollinearity problems in 
the quantile regression model, it has been chosed to concentrate on a single measure using 
the estimated value of closeness centrality from the total network (Figure 9), instead of the 
closeness centralities of the different networks (Table 21). Closeness centrality emphasizes 
                                                             
6
 Firms which do not belong to a pole have a closeness centrality equal to zero. 
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the independence of the actors and is linked to their ability to easily access informations, 
power and influence in the network (Prell 2012). This variable has been rescaled, 
according to the distribution of the qualified services values. Due to the absence of firm-
level data, this transformation is a sort of “distance attribution” in order to detect which 
firms have been more connected – in terms of amount of the subsidies – with their poles: 
firms which belong to the same pole but have received different amount of subsidies to 
purchase qualified services (from the pole) have a different value of closeness centrality.  
Table 22 Correlations between the different closeness centralities of the consultants 
network, the employees network, the incubators network, and the laboratories network  
 Consultants Employees Incubators Laboratories 
Consultants 1    
Employees 0.9882 1   
Incubators 0.9858 0.9924 1  
Laboratories 0.9696 0.9825 0.9717 1 
 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
To rescale closeness centrality, they have been identified two levels of discontinuity using 
the estimated probability density function of the variable which identifies the amount of 
the subsidies received by firm i (Figure 10). The rescaled closeness centrality for each firm 
i is the original closeness centrality weighted by a scalar which depends on its location 
respect to the discontinuity levels: 
[P 	= 	P 	 ∗ 	OV  ( 55 )   
where ICi is the rescaled closeness centrality of firm i, Ci is the original closeness centrality 
of firm i, and wti is a scalar which takes value 0.33 if the total amount of subsidies received 
by firm i is lower than 30,000 euro, takes value 0.66 if the total amount of subsidies 
received by firm i is between 30,000 and 75,000 euro, and takes value 1 if the total amount 
of subsidies received by firm i is greater than 75,000 euro. 
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Figure 10 Kernel density estimator (estimated probability density function) of the total 
amount of subsidies: red lines indicate the discontinuity values of 30,000 and 75,000 euro   
 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
The dependent variables used for the quantile regression model are the net values of the 
differences of TFP and LP for each firm i. From the pre-post differences of TFP and LP for 
each firm i they have been subtracted the pre-post differences means of TFP and LP for the 
firms which compose the counterfactual created using the radius matching (with radius 
equal to 0.0005 and equal to 0.0002): 
 	= 	 (FA 	− 	FA) −	(FA999999 	− 	FA999999)     if radius=0.0005 ( 56 )   
 	= 	 (A 	− 	A) −	(A9999 	− 	A9999)     if radius=0.0005  ( 57 )   
 	= 	 (FA 	− 	FA) −	(FA999999 	− 	FA999999)     if radius=0.0002 ( 58 )   
 	= 	 (A 	− 	A) −	(A9999 	− 	A9999)    if radius=0.0002 ( 59 )   
where Yi is the outcome for firm i (a and b indicate which kind of radius has been used to 
identify the counterfactual: respectively, 0.0005 and 0.0002), FA	and A	are the 
Total Factor Productivity and the Labor Productivity of firm i in the post treatment period, 
FA 	and A 	are the Total Factor Productivity and the Labor Productivity of firm i in 
the pre treatment period, FA	and A	are the mean Total Factor Productivity and 
the mean Labor Productivity of the counterfactual of firm i in the post treatment period, 
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FA 	and A 	are the mean Total Factor Productivity and the mean Labor Productivity 
of the counterfactual of firm i in the pre treatment period. Every firm i has been matched 
with a group of firms which belong to the same sector (mechanical, manufacturing, and 
services). 
After defining the dependent variable and the independent variable, it has been possibile to 
estimate the effect of the closeness centrality on the performance of the firms. Quantile 
regression (Koenker and Basset, 1978) has been used to estimate this effect. The quantile 
regression approach is a methodology to estimate the regression coefficients at different 
quantiles of the distribution of the response variable; it is more robust to non-normal errors 
and outliers compared to OLS, and it allows to consider the impact of a covariate on the 
entire distribution of the dependent variable, not merely on its conditional mean. 
They have been created four quantile regression model, one for each outcome estimated in 
equation ( 56 ), ( 57 ) , ( 58 ) , and ( 59 ):   
8yG 	= 	 	+ 	 [P	 +	     where τ = 0.33, 0.50, 0.66, 0.75, 0.90 ( 60 )   
` G 	= 	 	+	 [P	 +	     where τ = 0.33, 0.50, 0.66, 0.75, 0.90 ( 61 )   
8yG 	= 	 	+ 	 [P	 +	     where τ = 0.33, 0.50, 0.66, 0.75, 0.90 ( 62 )   
` G 	= 	 	+ 	 [P	 +	     where τ = 0.33, 0.50, 0.66, 0.75, 0.90 ( 63 )   
where τ indicates the quantile, and for each τ the estimated coefficient β illustrates the 
variation of the τ-quantile of the outcome (8yG, ` G, 8yG, ` G). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
Table 23 Estimation results of the equations ( 60 ), ( 61 ), ( 62 ), ( 63 ) 
Dep. var. YTFPa YLPa YTFPb YLPb 
IC     
q(0.33) 0.0427 0.130 0.120 0.291** 
 (0.0999) (0.114) (0.239) (0.128) 
q(0.50) 0.140 0.170 0.232 0.135 
 (0.107) (0.109) (0.174) (0.122) 
q(0.66) 0.187* 0.302** 0.297** 0.149 
 (0.112) (0.144) (0.125) (0.103) 
q(0.75) 0.283 0.216 0.240 0.254 
 (0.196) (0.162) (0.195) (0.173) 
q(0.90) 0.793** 0.620 0.869*** 0.550 
 (0.392) (0.441) (0.305) (0.373) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
Five quantiles have been choosed in order to test whether the centrality of a pole on a 
group of firms instead of another. It appears that the impact of the poles centrality is quite 
homogeneous: always positive e increasing in the top part of the distribution. It seems that 
the effect is more emphasized for the most productive firms. The null hypothesis is that the 
growth rates of the outcome (TFP or LP) do not differ at each quantile across different 
levels of centrality: this hypothesis is rejected for both the TFP of quantiles 0.66 and 0.90 
and the LP of quantile 0.66 (radius matching equal to 0.0005)7, showing a particularly 
positive situation for enterprises at the top level. 
These results mean that members of the Poli di innovazione have experienced on average 
an higher productivity gain respect to the firms which did not become members of the 
poles, and that being involved in a pole which is central – in terms of shared consultants, 
shared employees, shared laboratories, and shared incubators – is particularly convenient.   
  
                                                             
7
 And for the LP of quantile 0.33 (radius matching equal to 0.0002), which have also a large positive 
coefficient – compared to the other quantiles.   
91 
 
Conclusions 
The aim of this thesis is to assess the effect of an integrated system of innovation policies 
on the economic performances of Tuscan small and medium enterprises. Evaluation 
methods (matching and difference-in-differences) are used in combination with Social 
Network Analysis (SNA) in order to detect the effectiveness of these policies. 
Tuscany Region subsidized R&D activities through the call for tender Bando per 
l’acquisizione di servizi qualificati and the creation of the Poli di innovazione (Innovation 
poles). In the first case, a direct financing for purchasing qualified services was given to 
innovative projects; in the second case, firms were encouraged to join local networks 
composed of services centres, universities, private research centres, laboratories, and 
incubators. The Bando per l’acquisizione di servizi qualificati was active from 2008 to 
2013, while the Poli di innovazione were active from 2011 to 2014. Regional goals were 
focused to support innovation activities and networking between small and medium 
enterprises. The novelty of this research lies in the object of study and the evaluation 
approach: Tuscany Region integrated two different policies in order to support the 
innovation process, using a mixed top down/bottom up approach which has never been 
studied before. Moreover, this research is a first attempt to use SNA data in order to assess 
potential network’s effect on the performances of the enterprises.  
The analysis uses Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and Labor Productivity (LP) as 
measures of performance. For each firm, TFP is estimated using the Levinsohn and Petrin 
approach, which – differently from the classical OLS estimates of production functions – 
uses intermediate inputs as a proxy for productive shocks. LP is estimated using the ratio 
between value added and the number of employees per year. TFP and LP trends have been 
observed in the two-year period 2009-2010 and the two-year period 2012-2013: 2011 has 
been chosed as “treatment year”, because poles started to operate in that year – and their 
members started to apply to the call for tender using the benefit deriving from their 
membership.  
A combination of propensity score matching and difference-in-differences (DID) method is 
used to estimate the effect of these policies. Propensity score matching reduces the bias 
due to confounding variables that could be found in the estimate of the treatment effect; 
DID uses a before-after comparison across groups to estimate the treatment effect. This 
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methodology addresses endogeneity and provides more accurate estimates: matching 
controls for the selection bias restricting the DID estimates to a sub-sample of actors based 
on a set of observable characteristics. Radius Matching has been chosed as algorithm of 
matching, but they have been used two measures of radius (0.0005 and 0.0002) in order to 
control for counterfactual groups with different dimensions. 
Individually, the two policies have achieved different results. Considering the first 
treatment – firms which have received the R&D subsidies – the mechanical firms have 
experienced on average the highest productivity gain towards the end of the period of 
subsidization, compared to manufacturing firms and services firms which have received 
the subsidization. On average, the TFP and the LP of the mechanical firms which have 
been subsidized are around 10-15% higher than the mechanical firms which have not been 
subsidized, while manufacturing firms and services firms which have been subsidized have 
had a performance – in terms of TFP and LP increase – of nearly 10% higher than the 
firms which have not been subsidized. Both using a radius equal to 0.0005 or equal to 
0.0002 does not produce (totally) different results. Estimates are statistically significant for 
mechanical firms and manufacturing firms. These results are coherent with the purpose of 
the Tuscany Region, whose focus was on supporting the innovative process of small and 
medium enterprises belonging to the traditional manufacturing sector. 
Considering the second treatment – firms which have become members of the Poli di 
innovazione – the services firms which have joined the poles have experienced on average 
– compared to the firms which did not become members of a pole – a 10% increase of TFP 
and LP (statistically significant). Mechanical firms have experienced a positive increase 
which is halved respect to the firms which have received the R&D subsidies, while 
manufacturing firms have experienced a negative increase: both these results are not 
statistically significant. The results of this policy are completely different from the results 
of the Bando per l’acquisizione di servizi qualificati: the services firms have had more 
benefits from the membership to the Poli di innovazione, while the mechanical firms and 
the manufacturing firms have had more benefits from the R&D subsidies. 
Considering the third treatment – members of the poles which have been subsidized – it is 
interesting to notice that the combined effect of these policies is particularly effective for 
mechanical firms, which have experienced a 50-60% increase in the TFP and the LP. Also 
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for services firms the estimated results are strongly positive and statistically significant, but 
the dimension of the population – less than 100 firms which have received a R&D subsidy 
during their poles’ membership – lead to assume a careful interpretation of the effect of the 
(combined) policies. 
To assess the network effect of the Poli di innovazione on the performance of the SME, 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) has been used as evaluation method. Performance results 
of the firms which have received the R&D subsidies have been related to the centrality – in 
terms of shared consultants, employees, laboratories, and incubators – of their membership 
pole. As measures of performance, they have been choosed the differences between the net 
values of TFP and LP for each firm which has received the R&D subsidy and the net mean 
values of TFP and LP of each counterfactual group of firms selected using the above 
different radius matching. Due to the lack of data, no informations about the relationships 
between firms were available, but the closeness centrality of a pole has been used as a 
proxy of its ability to operate as a “bridge” between different organizations and facilitate 
the innovation process. A rescaled measure of closeness centrality – based on the total 
amount of subsidies received by the members of the poles – has been used in a quantile 
regression model in order to understand if being central is a benefit or not. Quantile 
regression has been choosed because of the dataset: around 200 firms do not belong to a 
pole, while around 60 firms belong to – at least – one pole, i.e. this distribution could affect 
an ordinary least squares regression. Furthermore, a quantile regression is more robust to 
non-normal errors and outliers, and provides a richer characterization of the data, allowing 
to consider the impact of a covariate on the entire distribution of the outcome variable, not 
merely its conditional mean. 
It has emerged that if a firm belong to a central pole it experiences a positive gain in terms 
of TFP and LP increase, but the increase is decisively high – and statistically significant – 
only for the firms which already have the best performances of TFP and LP increase. Five 
quantiles have been choosed in order to test whether the centrality of a pole on a group of 
firms instead of another, and it has been discovered that over the quantile (0.66) the “pole 
effect” is relevant and almost statistically significant, except for the LP estimated with the 
second radius matching (0.0002). It means that members of the Poli di innovazione have 
experienced on average an higher productivity gain respect to the firms which did not 
become members of the poles, and that being involved in a pole which is central – in terms 
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of shared consultants, shared employees, shared laboratories, and shared incubators – is 
convenient.     
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Appendix A 
 
List of the qualified services 
Type       List of services 
  
A. 
First level 
qualified services 
(Servizi 
qualificati di 
primo livello) 
A.1 ‐ Servizi di audit e assessment del potenziale 
A.2 ‐ Studi di fattibilità di primo livello 
  
B. 
Specialized 
qualified services 
(Servizi 
qualificati 
specializzati) 
B.1.1 - Servizi di supporto alla innovazione di 
prodotto nella fase di concetto 
B.1.2 - Servizi di supporto all'introduzione di 
nuovi prodotti 
B.1.3 - Servizi tecnici di progettazione per 
innovazione di prodotto e di processo produttivo 
B.1.4 - Servizi tecnici di sperimentazione (prove e 
test) 
B.1.5 - Servizi di gestione della proprietà 
intellettuale 
B.1.6 - Ricerca tecnico-scientifica a contratto 
B.1.7 - Servizi di supporto all’innovazione 
dell’offerta 
B.2.1 - Servizi di supporto al cambiamento 
organizzativo 
B.2.2 - Servizi di miglioramento della efficienza 
delle operazioni produttive 
B.2.3 - Gestione della catena di fornitura o supply 
chain management 
B.2.4 - Supporto alla certificazione avanzata 
B.2.5 - Servizi per l’efficienza energetica 
B.2.6 - Servizi per l’efficienza ambientale 
B.2.7 - Servizi di supporto all'innovazione 
organizzativa mediante gestione temporanea di 
impresa (Temporary management – TM) 
B.3.1 - Supporto alla introduzione di innovazioni 
nella gestione delle relazioni con i clienti 
B.3.2 - Supporto allo sviluppo di reti distributive 
specializzate ed alla promozione di prodotti 
B.3.3 - Servizi di valorizzazione della proprietà 
intellettuale 
B.4.1 - Servizi qualificati specifici per la creazione 
di nuove imprese innovative 
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− B.4.1.1 - Pre-incubazione 
− B.4.1.2 - Incubazione 
− B.4.1.3 - Accompagnamento commerciale 
e accelerazione 
B.4.2 - Servizi qualificati specifici a domanda 
collettiva 
− B.4.2.1 - Marchi collettivi 
− B.4.2.2 - Tracciabilità dei prodotti 
− B.4.2.3 - Certificazione di filiera 
− B.4.2.4 - Logistica e supply chain 
management 
− B.4.2.5 – Reti distributive e gestione delle 
relazioni con i clienti 
− B.4.2.6 - Temporary management 
− B.4.2.7 – Supporto alla costituzione di 
Organizzazioni interprofessionali e alla 
progettazione dei servizi connessi 
  
C. 
Internazionalizati
on services 
(Servizi 
all’internazionaliz
zazione) 
C.1.1 - Partecipazione a fiere e saloni 
internazionali 
C.1.2 - Creazione di uffici o sale espositive 
all’estero 
C.1.3 - Realizzazione di nuovi centri di assistenza 
tecnica post-vendita all’estero 
C.1.4 - Realizzazione di nuove strutture logistiche 
all’estero di transito e di distribuzione 
internazionale di prodotti 
C.2.1 - Servizi promozionali 
C.2.2 - Supporto specialistico 
all’internazionalizzazione 
C.2.3 - Supporto all'innovazione commerciale per 
la fattibilità di presidio su nuovi mercati 
  
 
Source of Data: Tuscany Region 
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Appendix B 
 
Adjacency matrices of the graphs representing the different networks (consultants, 
employees, laboratories, incubators, and their sum) created by the Poli di innovazione. 
 
Adjacency matrix of the network of shared consultants 
 
 
Opto
scan
a 
Inno
pape
r 
Otir
2020 
Scie
nze 
della 
Vita 
Pietr
e 
Tosc
ane 
Pent
a 
Polis Nan
oxm 
Cent
o 
Pierr
e 
Polo
12 
Polit
er 
Optoscana 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Innopaper 0 20 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Otir2020 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Scienze della Vita 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pietre Toscane 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Penta 0 1 0 0 0 39 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Polis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nanoxm 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Cento 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 17 0 0 0 
Pierre 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 
Polo12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 
Politer 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
 
Adjacency matrix of the network of shared employees 
 
 
Opto
scan
a 
Inno
pape
r 
Otir
2020 
Scie
nze 
della 
Vita 
Pietr
e 
Tosc
ane 
Pent
a 
Polis Nan
oxm 
Cent
o 
Pierr
e 
Polo
12 
Polit
er 
Optoscana 29 0 3 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 6 1 
Innopaper 0 24 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 1 
Otir2020 3 0 44 0 0 0 4 0 1 3 10 1 
Scienze della Vita 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 6 
Pietre Toscane 0 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Penta 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 7 4 0 0 
Polis 6 4 4 0 0 0 55 3 1 2 14 5 
Nanoxm 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 25 2 6 2 2 
Cento 0 0 1 0 0 7 1 2 34 4 0 2 
Pierre 0 0 3 2 0 4 2 6 4 56 2 8 
Polo12 6 0 10 2 0 0 14 2 0 2 37 4 
Politer 1 1 1 6 0 0 5 2 2 8 4 82 
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Adjacency matrix of the network of shared laboratories 
 
 
Opto
scan
a 
Inno
pape
r 
Otir
2020 
Scie
nze 
della 
Vita 
Pietr
e 
Tosc
ane 
Pent
a 
Polis Nan
oxm 
Cent
o 
Pierr
e 
Polo
12 
Polit
er 
Optoscana 14 0 0 0 0 0 11 0 1 1 0 1 
Innopaper 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 
Otir2020 0 0 6 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Scienze della Vita 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Pietre Toscane 0 0 0 0 3 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 
Penta 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Polis 11 4 0 0 2 0 100 3 12 25 4 15 
Nanoxm 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 0 1 1 0 
Cento 1 1 1 0 0 1 12 0 12 0 1 0 
Pierre 1 0 0 0 1 0 25 1 0 23 2 3 
Polo12 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 1 1 2 9 0 
Politer 1 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 3 0 17 
 
Adjacency matrix of the network of shared incubators 
 
 
Opto
scan
a 
Inno
pape
r 
Otir
2020 
Scie
nze 
della 
Vita 
Pietr
e 
Tosc
ane 
Pent
a 
Polis Nan
oxm 
Cent
o 
Pierr
e 
Polo
12 
Polit
er 
Optoscana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Innopaper 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Otir2020 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Scienze della Vita 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Pietre Toscane 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Penta 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Polis 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Nanoxm 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cento 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 3 1 0 0 
Pierre 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 1 
Polo12 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Politer 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 3 
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Adjacency matrix of the network of shared consultants, employees, laboratories, and 
incubators 
 
 
Opto
scan
a 
Inno
pape
r 
Otir
2020 
Scie
nze 
della 
Vita 
Pietr
e 
Tosc
ane 
Pent
a 
Polis Nan
oxm 
Cent
o 
Pierr
e 
Polo
12 
Polit
er 
Optoscana 44 0 3 0 0 0 17 0 1 1 6 2 
Innopaper 0 49 0 0 0 1 8 0 1 0 0 1 
Otir2020 3 0 69 0 0 2 4 0 3 4 10 2 
Scienze della Vita 0 0 0 32 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 7 
Pietre Toscane 0 0 0 0 26 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 
Penta 0 1 2 0 0 68 0 0 10 5 0 0 
Polis 17 8 4 0 2 0 156 6 14 27 18 21 
Nanoxm 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 30 2 7 3 2 
Cento 1 1 3 0 0 10 14 2 66 5 1 2 
Pierre 1 0 4 2 1 5 27 7 5 84 7 12 
Polo12 6 0 10 4 0 0 18 3 1 7 50 5 
Politer 2 1 2 7 0 0 21 2 2 12 5 104 
 
 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
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Appendix C 
 
Correlations between centrality measures of the different networks (consultants, 
employees, laboratories, incubators): 
 
- Degree centrality 
 Consultants Employees Incubators Laboratories 
Consultants 1    
Employees 0.7878 1   
Incubators 0.8677 0.9186 1  
Laboratories 0.6900 0.9550 0.8690 1 
 
- Bonacich Power centrality 
 Consultants Employees Incubators Laboratories 
Consultants 1    
Employees 0.2929 1   
Incubators 0.4582 0.8454 1  
Laboratories 0.3475 0.9045 0.6902 1.0000 
 
- Eigenvector centrality 
 Consultants Employees Incubators Laboratories 
Consultants 1    
Employees 0.2679 1   
Incubators 0.4356 0.8439 1  
Laboratories 0.3299 0.9036 0.6871 1 
 
- Betweenness centrality 
 Consultants Employees Incubators Laboratories 
Consultants 1    
Employees -0.0428 1   
Incubators -0.0288 0.8635 1  
Laboratories -0.0387 0.7401 0.4452 1 
 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
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Correlations between centrality measures of the total network 
 Degree Bonacich Closeness Eigenvector Betweenness 
Degree 1     
Bonacich 0.9981 1    
Closeness 0.9938 0.9936 1   
Eigenvector 0.9981 1.0000 0.9935 1  
Betweenness 0.8069 0.7748 0.7642 0.7749 1 
 
Source of Data: Author’s elaboration 
 
